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Abstract 
This paper aims to analyse whether and to what extent Euro-crisis law – a mix of international, 
European and national measures adopted in reaction to the Eurozone crisis – has affected 
constitutional case law in three Eurozone countries receiving financial support or assistance and 
provided with a Constitutional Court: Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The paper identifies elements of 
continuity and innovation in the rulings of the three Courts compared to the pre-crisis period by 
looking at how constitutional judges ‘manage’ social rights and regional autonomy, and how they 
develop their constitutional reasoning. It is argued that, contrary to expectations because of the new 
fiscal constraints and although with some remarkable differences, Euro-crisis case law is usually in 
continuity with the past rulings of these Constitutional Courts and this is due both to legal elements – 
like access to the Court, its composition, the appointment of judges, the effects and timing of 
decisions, and the standards for review – and non-legal elements – like the economic situation and 
changes occurring in the political context. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last four years, the reform of economic governance in the EU has imposed strict fiscal 
constraints on the public accounts of the Eurozone countries by way of international, European, and, 
consequently, national measures. For the purpose of this paper this complex and heterogeneous body 
of law is named ‘Euro-crisis law’.1  
Indeed, Euro-crisis law stems from a complex of legal measures and primarily affects the Eurozone 
countries – and to a lesser extent non-Eurozone Member States, especially those receiving financial 
support, depending on their actual economic situation, e.g. whether a bailout has been declared or not. 
The notion of Euro-crisis law encompasses a wide range of sources of law: EU law, like the six-pack 
and the two-pack;2 international agreements signed by all Eurozone Member States, like the Treaty on 
the European Stability Mechanism (TESM); bilateral agreements providing loan assistance to a 
specific country; and national law, at the constitutional or subconstitutional level, like balanced budget 
clauses or European-driven structural reforms. There is no scholarly agreement on whether 
international and European Euro-crisis law leaves a narrow or wide margin for manoeuvre to national 
legislators.3 However, this discretion is certainly far more limited in States that are subject to strict 
conditionality and to macroeconomic imbalances and excessive deficit procedures. 
While in matters of European and Monetary Union (EMU) the role of the Court of Justice of the EU is 
definitely limited in comparison with other fields of law, there is the prospect that Euro-crisis law may 
prompt a more active role for national courts and especially for constitutional judges.4 In particular, 
these judges are called on to solve an increasing number of constitutional conflicts deriving from 
potential clashes that the new measures are likely to introduce between rights protection, institutional 
roles and autonomy of the different levels of government on the one hand, and a tightening of public 
resources in a time of economic crisis on the other. This does not imply, however, that constitutional 
judges are always willing to adjudicate such cases and that they are keen to invalidate legislation in a 
much more pervasive manner than they usually do in times of ‘ordinary constitutional life’. Depending 
on the external non-legal and legal constraints in which judges operate – again, bailout or non-bailout 
country, political context, past case law, and judicial appointments – and on the system of 
constitutional adjudication, the judicial reaction might also be limited to confirming the decisions 
taken by political actors and to relying on previous case law. The increasing number of constitutional 
conflicts to be adjudicated by the courts rather than being solved by politics does not hinder the fact 
that constitutional judges might well accept ‘the primacy of discretionary politics in the management 
                                                     
1 The expression ‘Euro-crisis law’ is borrowed from the title of a research project run by the Law Department of the 
European University Institute, Florence: ‘Constitutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law (2013-2015)’. 
2 The so-called six-pack is composed of five regulations and a directive which entered into force on 13 December 2011 (EU 
Regulations, no 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, and 1177/2011 and Directive EU 2011/85, OJEU L 306, vol. 54, 23 November 
2011). The two-pack is composed of two EU Regulations (regulations no 472 and 473/2013, OJEU L140, vol. 56, 27 
May 2013). Finally, the TESM entered into force on 27 September 2012 and the mechanism has been in operation since 8 
October 2012. 
3 For example, Article 3.2. of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
(hereinafter, Fiscal Compact) creates an obligation, at least for the Contracting Parties within the Euro area, to adopt a 
balanced budget rule ‘through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or 
otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes’, by one year after 
its entry into force on 1 January 2013. However, only a minority of Eurozone countries (like Italy and Spain) have 
constitutionalised the balanced budget clause, which means that a constitutional reform was an option but was not 
mandatory. See, for Italy, M. Luciani, ‘L’equilibrio di bilancio e i principi fondamentali: la prospettiva del controllo di 
costituzionalità’, Conference organized at the Italian Constitutional Court on Il principio dell’equilibrio di bilancio 
secondo la riforma costituzionale del 2012, Rome, 22 November 2013, p. 11; for Spain, see M. Aragón Reyes, ‘Encuesta 
sobra la reforma constitucional. La reforma de l’articulo 135 CE’. Revista española de derecho constitucional, no. 16, 
2011, p. 169. Compare also the decision of the Conseil constitutionnel no. 2012-653 DC, 9 August 2012. 
4 See F. Fabbrini, ‘The Fiscal Compact, the golden rule and the paradox of European federalism’. Boston College 
International & Comparative Law Review, 36 (1), 2013, p. 1-38. 
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of the crisis’ and might fail ‘to develop any criteria against which the legitimacy of these practices 
might be assessed’.5 
To date, a massive amount of literature has dealt with the role of constitutional and supreme courts in 
matters of budget and of legislation that has financial implications.6 The difficulty encountered by 
judges in taking decisions that so directly affect the rights of people, the rule of law, and the inter-
institutional balance has been strongly emphasised.7 While so far the literature has mainly focused on 
the judicial review of specific European and international law measures linked to the financial crisis,8 
a comparative analysis of the role of constitutional judges in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis is 
still lacking.9 
The aim of the paper is to fill this gap and to answer the following questions. What is the reaction of 
constitutional judges, in particular in some Eurozone Member States experiencing financial troubles – 
namely, in Italy, Portugal and Spain – to the crisis? Has the Euro-crisis law represented a breakthrough 
                                                     
5 See M. Everson & C. Joerges, ‘Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe after the Financial Crisis?’, LSE 
‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series, no. 63, 2013, p. 23, available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper63.pdf. In other words, judicial activism as a reaction against 
the measures adopted to contrast the crisis cannot be taken for granted. 
6 From classics, like A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd ed., Yale, Yale 
University Press, 1986, esp. p. 111 ff. and C. Mezzanotte [1984], Corte costituzionale e legittimazione politica, new 
edition, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2014, p. 1-55 to national case study – see, e.g., V. Onida, Le leggi di spesa nella 
Costituzione, Milano, Giuffrè, 1969, G. Rivosecchi, L’indirizzo politico finanziario tra Costituzione italiana e vincoli 
europei, Padova, Cedam, 2007, p. 212 ff., and V. Ruiz Almendral, Estabilidad Presupuestaria y Gasto Público en 
España, Madrid, Editorial La Ley, 2008 – and to the context of the European Union – M. Maduro, We the Court: The 
European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution, Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 35 ff., and G. Delledonne, 
‘A Legalization of Financial Constitutions in the EU? Reflections on the German, Spanish, Italian and French 
Experiences’, in M. Adams, F. Fabbrini, & P. Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary 
Constraints, Oxford-Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 181-204. 
7 See, for example, E. Chiti & P. G. Texeira, ‘The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and 
Public Debt Crisis’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 50, no. 3, 2013, p. 683-708, D. Curtin, ‘Challenging Executive 
Dominance in European Democracy’, Modern Law Review, vol. 77, no. 1, 2014, p. 1-32, and C. Kilpatrick, On the Rule 
of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s bailouts, 2014, forthcoming. 
8 Great attention has been devoted, for example, to the judicial reception of the Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) and to the Fiscal Compact – on which see, e.g., F. Fabbrini, ‘The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and 
the Political Process in Comparative Perspective’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, vol. 32, no. 1, 2014 
forthcoming, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2328060, and S. Bardutzky & E. Fahey, 
‘Judicial Review of Eurozone Law: The Adjudication of Postnational Norms in EU Courts, Plural - A Case study of the 
European Stability Mechanism’, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No. 2013-06, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2287917## – as well as to specific rulings of national 
Constitutional and Supreme Courts, like the Pringle case – see P. Craig, ‘Guest Editorial: Pringle: Legal Reasoning, 
Text, Purpose and Teleology’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law vol. 20, no. 1, 2013, p. 3-11, B. de 
Witte & T. Beukers, ‘The Court of Justice approves the creation of the European Stability Mechanism outside the EU 
legal order: Pringle’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 50, no. 3, 2013, p. 805-848, and V. Borger, ‘The ESM and the 
European Court’s Predicament in Pringle’, German Law Journal, vol. 14, no. 1, 2013, p. 113-139 – or the decision of the 
German Constitutional Court to issue a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union about the 
validity of the outright monetary transaction programme – see the special issue of the German Law Journal on OMT, vol. 
15, no. 2, 2014.  
9 There have been either contributions on the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis from the point of view of the 
European Union – see, for example, K. Tuori & K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, esp. p. 117 ff. – or ones devoted to a specific Member State – see e.g. J. García Roca 
& M. Á. Martínez Lago, Estabilidad presupuestaria y consagración del freno constitucional al endeudamiento, 
Pamplona, Aranzadi, 2013, p. 65 ff. and the special issue of Revista General de Derecho Público Comparado, Sabrina 
Ragone (ed.) on ‘Costes y beneficios de la descentralización política en un contexto de crisis’, no. 15, 2014 – or 
collections of country studies focused on specific aspects of constitutional law, although not on a comparative analysis of 
Constitutional Courts – see, e.g., X. Contiades (ed.), Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparative 
Analysis, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, and C. Kilpatrick and B. de Witte (eds.) Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the 
Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges, Law 2014/05 EUI Working Paper. 
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for their case law? These issues will be addressed by looking at constitutional judgments since 2010, 
and in particular at the case law on measures having a financial impact (fiscal consolidation 
programmes, structural reforms, budgetary acts) to consider how the case law of the courts has been 
affected by Euro-crisis law. 
Italy, Portugal and Spain have been selected as case studies as they are three Eurozone countries 
which have received financial support or assistance, but to a different degree. Portugal has been a 
bailout country since 2011, and thus subject to strict conditionality, and exited the financial and 
assistance programme only in May 2014. Italy and Spain benefited from the Securities Markets 
Programme of the European Central Bank, and Spain requested a bailout only for the financial sector. 
Therefore, the constraints imposed on Portugal were far more severe that those on Spain and Italy. As 
a consequence, different economic and legal situations might have played a role in the reactions of the 
Constitutional Courts towards Euro-crisis law. 
However, a comparison between Italy, Portugal and Spain is interesting for another reason. Italy and 
Spain are based on a centralized model of constitutional review of legislation, with an ad hoc 
Constitutional Court designed to this end (Articles 134 It. Const.; 159 Sp. Const.).10 For the purpose of 
the present paper, Portugal can also be included in this category. Although this latter country has a 
hybrid system of constitutional review of legislation, partly centralized in the hands of the 
Constitutional Court and partly decentralized to ordinary judges,11 all the relevant constitutional 
judgments on Euro-crisis law were issued by the Portuguese Constitutional Court assuming original 
jurisdiction on the constitutional challenges. On two occasions, the Court was asked to accomplish an 
ex ante review of a Euro-crisis measure (Article 278 Pt. Const.); the remaining cases were adjudicated 
by the Constitutional Court on the basis of challenges brought ex post by the actors empowered to do 
so by the Constitution (Article 281 Pt. Const.). None of these decisions represented the outcome of an 
appeal against a ruling by an ordinary court. 
Although the three States are provided with a Constitutional Court as the institution primarily entitled 
to solve constitutional conflicts dealing with Euro-crisis law, these Courts differ substantially 
regarding the avenues along which to bring constitutional challenges before them, the way the 
constitutional proceeding is designed and the timing of their decisions. These procedural constraints 
can substantially affect the outcomes of constitutional case law.   
Finally, the Constitutions of these three Eurozone countries as standards for review also appear 
somewhat different in terms of protection of social rights, of constitutionalisation of budgetary 
constraints, and of guarantees of regional legislative and budgetary autonomy, all of them being areas 
that are more likely than others to be deeply affected by Euro-crisis law.  
The main claim of this paper is that constitutional review of Euro-crisis law by the Italian, the 
Portuguese and the Spanish Constitutional Courts has not represented a breakthrough in their case law, 
contrary to what one might have expected. Instead, elements of continuity seem to prevail, even in the 
case of Portugal, whose Court has been severely criticized, in particular for judgments from 2013 
onwards. Euro-crisis law has confirmed or strengthened trends in constitutional jurisprudence that 
                                                     
10 Among the many authors on the topic, see M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, New York, Bobbs-
Merrill Co., Inc., 1971, esp. p. 45 ff., L. Favoreu & W. Mastor, Les Cours Constitutionnelles, Paris, Dalloz, 2011, and M. 
De Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe. A Comparative Analysis, Oxford and Portland/Or, Hart Publishing, 2013, A. 
Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’, in M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 816-830. 
11 See A. Alen & M. Melchior, ‘The relations between the Constitutional Courts and the other national courts, including the 
interference in this area of action of European courts’, General Report, Conference of European Constitutional Courts, 
XIIth Congress, Brussels, May 2002, and M. L. Amaral, ‘Problemas de Judicial Review em Portugal’, Themis. Revista da 
Facultade de Direito da UNL, vol. VI, no. 10, 2005, p. 69-70; J. de Sousa Ribeiro & E. Mealha, ‘Portugal’, in A.R. 
Brewer-Carias (ed.), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators. A Comparative Study, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University press, 2013, p. 721. 
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were already present before the financial crisis or that could be detected through a close look at 
constitutional judgments delivered before the most acute phase of the crisis, i.e. the one leading to a 
request for financial support or assistance. Such an outcome – it is argued – depends in particular on 
the national design of the constitutional review of legislation, which shapes the context in which the 
three Courts take their decisions and play their institutional role, including during the crisis. As 
mentioned, this design may be different in Italy, Portugal and Spain, but it is the main reason for 
continuity, with a few exceptions, prevailing. This continuity in the case law of each Court, however, 
does not necessarily imply that the contents of the decisions of the three Courts resemble one another. 
There are common trends, for example the constraint of regional autonomy or the preferential use of 
constitutional principles – e.g. equality and proportionality – in the adjudication of social rights, but 
there are also significant signs of divergence among these Courts, for example regarding the 
constitutional tolerance of limitations to social rights, which can be explained in the light of the 
constitutional standard of review as well as of non-legal elements, such as the particular economic 
situations. This is why the analysis of the case law dealing with social rights and with regional 
legislative competence is presented here by country. 
The paper is organised as follows: section II defines the context of the operation of the Constitutional 
Courts, in terms of legal and non-legal constraints, and the systems of constitutional adjudication, for 
example regarding the composition and access to the Courts; section III is devoted to an analysis of 
the constitutional case law by looking at continuity and innovations in the three main fields that are 
deemed crucial for legal systems during the Euro-crisis: the protection of social rights, regional 
autonomy, and constitutional reasoning. Finally, section IV tries to draw some conclusions on 
constitutional adjudication of Euro-crisis law. 
II. ITALY, PORTUGAL, AND SPAIN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
II. A Political and economic situation 
During the Eurozone crisis, in particular from 2010 onwards, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have featured 
one or more changes of government composition following elections. Since November 2011, Italy has 
experienced the alternation of three different governments: after Silvio Berlusconi, leader of the 
centre-right ruling coalition, resigned following changes in the composition of the coalition and 
troubles in the legislative process of approval of the annual audit report, a ‘technical government’ led 
by Mario Monti, former member of the European Commission, and composed of Ministers devoid of a 
parliamentary mandate – i.e. unelected – was appointed. This government resigned on 21 December 
2012, once most of the tasks for which it was appointed, namely starting a process of restoration of 
sound public accounts and getting the spread between Italian and German government bonds under 
control, had been accomplished. A general election took place in February 2013 and led to political 
deadlock due to an inability to create a new government. In the aftermath of this political crisis, the 
decision was taken to summon the new Parliament for the election of the new President of the 
Republic, whose mandate expired in the same period. For the first time ever in Italian constitutional 
history, former President Giorgio Napolitano was re-elected. On 28 April 2013, Napolitano then 
appointed as new head of the Government Enrico Letta from within the Democratic Party, the party 
that had a relative majority in the two chambers. Because of an internal struggle for the leadership of 
the Democratic Party, Enrico Letta was forced to resign, and the new secretary of the party, Matteo 
Renzi, has been the President of the Council of Ministers since 22 February 2014. 
Political stability in Portugal has been deeply affected by financial troubles, by Euro-crisis law, and by 
the threat of bankruptcy. In March 2011, Prime Minister José Sócrates was forced to resign after the 
rejection of the government amendments to the Growth and Stability Pact 2011 that every Eurozone 
country has to transmit to the European Commission during the European Semester. Consequently, a 
general election was held on 5 June 2011, which led to the defeat of the then ruling majority and in 
particular of the socialists, and recorded the lowest turnout ever in the history of democratic Portugal. 
The centre-right Social Democratic Party became the first party of the country and its leader, Pedro 
Passos Coelho, was appointed Prime Minister of a coalition government with the CDS-People’s party 
on 16 June 2011. Since then, the life of the government has been characterized by tensions with 
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opposition parties, by reshuffles, and by requests for several votes of no-confidence, especially on the 
implementation of Euro-crisis law through the budgetary process. 
Finally, in Spain the ruling majority changed in November 2011 after a general election. The last act 
of the incumbent Prime Minister, the socialist José Zapatero, before he asked the King to call a new 
election and dissolve the Parliament, was to have the constitutional reform on financial sustainability 
passed. The new Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, leader of the People’s Party, can count on a 
comfortable majority in Parliament and, notwithstanding the opposition of the left-wing political 
parties, the implementation of Euro-crisis law has been relatively smooth. 
These three Eurozone countries have experienced severe financial troubles, are suffering from high 
unemployment rates, and are or were subject to an excessive deficit procedure: on 29 May 2013 the 
excessive deficit procedure against Italy was abolished and the deadlines for the correction of 
excessive deficits were extended for Portugal and Spain. 
Although the three states were subject to financial support and assistance programmes, their economic 
and financial situations are not exactly alike. The size of their GDPs certainly has an influence on their 
respective ‘contractual power’ in the management of the Eurozone crisis. The Italian and the Spanish 
GDPs are respectively almost ten and six times the size of the Portuguese GDP. Having the third and 
the fourth largest GDPs in the European Union, Italy and Spain appear to be ‘too big to fail’ without 
bringing the entire Eurozone to a collapse. 
The extent and aim of the financial support and assistance was also different. For example, Italy has 
never been in the position to request a bailout, as the other two countries did (Spain only for the 
financial sector); Spain and Portugal officially exited the bailout programme on 23 January 2014 and 
on 16 May 2014 respectively. Italy only benefited from the European Central Bank’s Securities 
Markets Programme, a form of financial support that was not even advertised within the country or 
debated in Parliament, although Italy was the first beneficiary of this kind of measure in the 
Eurozone.12 Given the huge size of the Italian public debt and the speculative attack, the European 
Central Bank secured over 100 billions of euros of Italian bonds from the market in 2011 and 2012, in 
exchange for an assurance on the part of the Italian Government about structural reforms to be 
undertaken, limitation of the deficit, and reduction of the debt.13 The Securities Markets Programme 
has been used by the other two countries, too, but for a more limited amount. 
In addition to this, in 2012 the Spanish Government requested and obtained financial assistance for the 
re-capitalisation and the restructuring of the banking sector via the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), a private fund established in Luxembourg under Luxembourg Law on the basis of an 
international agreement signed in 2010 by all the Eurozone countries. Under the supervision of the 
European Central Bank, the Commission, and the International Momentary Fund, Spain signed the 
Financial Assistance Facility Agreement – an international agreement – with the EFSF and a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality on 20 July 2012, in which a 
roadmap and specific instructions for Spain, including regarding the legislation to be adopted, were 
                                                     
12 See the Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities markets programme 
(ECB/2010/5), OJEU L124/8, 20.5.2010. For the case of Italy, reference has been made to ‘financial support’ since 
‘financial assistance’ is deemed to be a tool of economic policy from which the European Central Bank is excluded, at 
least according to the recent (and the first) order for a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
issued by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on 14 January 2014; see 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 
2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13, para. 65. I am grateful to Thomas Beukers for pointing this out to me. In Italy, the 
use of the Securities Markets Programme was disclosed by an Italian newspaper, Corriere della Sera, in September 2011, 
whereas the Parliament was officially informed 8 months later through the Annual Report of the Bank of Italy for 2011 of 
31 May 2012. 
13 From August to November 2011, there was an intense exchange of letters between European Institutions, in particular the 
European Central Bank, and the Italian Government requiring it to restate its commitment to the reforms required. 
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set.14 Spain received the financial assistance in two disbursements, in December 2012 and February 
2013, the latter by means of the European Stability Mechanism, which meanwhile had replaced the 
EFSF.  
The economic situation in Portugal appeared even worse. On 6 April 2011, the resigning Prime 
Minister Sócrates declared the bankruptcy of the public finances and the day afterwards he notified the 
European Commission, the Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund of a request for 
financial assistance. On 17 May 2011, the Council of the EU agreed to provide assistance to Portugal 
subject to precise conditions for the recovery of the country. The Memorandum of Understanding on 
Specific Economic Policy Conditionality and the Loan Agreement were then signed. Unlike Spain, 
which relied on the EFSF and later on the European Stability Mechanism, the assistance to Portugal 
was split between three instruments: the EFSF, for the greatest part, the International Monetary Fund 
directly, and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), established under EU law by 
Council Regulation EU no. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010.15 Financial assistance was assured for three 
years – subject to review before each instalment was paid – and thus expired in mid-2014. Given the 
situation, financial assistance was coupled with a Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies 
for the same period imposing a series of structural reforms and the consolidation of the financial 
sector. This eventually bound the new government to also cut wages and pensions, particularly in the 
public sector; a decision that was tolerated by the Constitutional Court only until 2012. 
In particular in the case of Portugal, financial assistance programmes are a mixture of EU and 
international legal norms: the EU arm of the rescue package is provided by the EFSM, established by 
means of Council Regulation EU n. 407/2010 and the specific implementing decisions of the Council 
of the EU; the international arm, instead, is composed of the Financial Facility Assistance Agreement 
between the beneficiary state and the EFSF, and the Memoranda of Understanding, in their various 
forms (on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, on Economic and Financial Policies, and 
Technical Memoranda).16 As was predictable, the heterogeneity in the nature and the sources of the 
legal constraints that bind these three Eurozone countries receiving financial assistance or support 
creates much confusion in their judicial treatment before constitutional judges.17 
II.B Brief overview of the systems of constitutional adjudication 
(i) Composition of Constitutional Courts and appointments 
The procedures for the appointment of constitutional judges in the three States and their actual 
application since 2010 are particularly important to understand the development of constitutional case 
law in each country. 
                                                     
14 It is Article 2 of the EFSF framework agreement that prescribes this arrangement. A Memorandum of Understanding is 
negotiated by the beneficiary state with the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund, on the basis of a Council Decision – in the case of Spain, EU Decision n. 443/2012 of 23 July 2012 
addressed to Spain on specific measures to reinforce financial stability – adopted according to Article 136 TFEU. The 
legal nature of the Memorandum of Understanding has been discussed by scholars: some of them consider it legally 
binding (see E. Correia Baptista, ‘Natureza Jurídica dos Memorandos com o FMI e com a União Europeia”, in Revista da 
Ordem dos Advogados, Ano 71, II, 2011, pp. 477-488); according to others, the Memorandum contains guidelines of a 
political character (see G. Katrougalos, ‘The Greek Austerity Measures: Violations of Socio-Economic Rights’, Int’l J. 
Const. L. Blog, 29 January 2013, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/01/the-greek-austerity-measures-
violations-of-socio-economic-rights. 
15 The EFSM ‘arm’ of the financial assistance is regulated by the Council of the EU Implementing Decision no. 344/2011 of 
30 May 2011 on granting Union financial assistance to Portugal, which has been subject to several revisions; the latest of 
them was COM(2014) 54 final. 
16 They are contained in the Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal, which has been subject to eleven reviews. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/portugal/index_en.htm  
17 See C. Kilpatrick, An economic emergency? The degradation of basic legal values in Europe’s bailouts, unpublished 
manuscript, EUI Law Department, Seminar in Social Rights, Fall 2013, p. 12. 
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In Portugal, ten of the thirteen constitutional judges are elected by a parliamentary majority (Article 
222 Pt. Const.) – of two thirds of the deputies present who represent the absolute majority in 
Parliament (Article 16, Law no. 28/82) – and the remaining three are co-opted by those in office. 
Although constitutional judges have to be lawyers or judges from other courts (Article 13, Law no. 
28/82) they are chosen mainly by political parties and by the ruling majority at the time, and the 
judiciary itself is not involved in the process of appointments, unlike in Italy and Spain, where a quota 
of constitutional judges is chosen either by the ordinary and administrative higher courts or by the 
judicial self-governing body (Articles 135 It. Const. and 159 Sp. Const.).  
The mandate is for nine years (non-renewable) in the three Courts, but, interestingly, in Portugal half 
of the Court – six members including the three co-opted – was renewed from 2012 to 2014, which is in 
the period in which the Constitutional Court adopted its most controversial decisions against the 
austerity measures. Moreover, in 2011 new parliamentary elections took place causing a shift in power 
between the majority and the opposition. Thus, the new constitutional judges were elected thanks to 
the support of the new government coalition. The impact on constitutional case law has been 
significant. As the Portuguese Constitutional Court decides by a majority whenever unanimity cannot 
be reached, and minority opinions are disclosed, it is clear that since 2012 the Court has been 
constantly divided when judging on Euro-crisis law, i.e. on the austerity measures adopted during the 
bailout.18 Almost all the relevant judgments have been taken with a 7-to-6 majority. Furthermore, 
every judge has been in the minority on one of the issues under review while at the same time being 
part of the majority on the other issues (decisions nos. 187/2013 and 413/2014). 
The change of the political majority in the Parliament, the bailout, and the renewal of its composition 
have altered the internal balance within the Portuguese Constitutional Court. For example, Acórdão 
no. 353/2012, which declared the unconstitutionality of two articles of the Budget Act for 2012 – 
passed by the new Parliament – and which marked a turn in the case law of the Court on Euro-crisis 
law, was passed because of the support of the ‘old’ judges, elected during the leadership of the 
socialist party. In a previous judgment, no. 396/2011, based on the Budget Act for 2011, they had 
already set a threshold for what is admissible in terms of social security cutbacks and what is not. 
A similar split in the operation of the Constitutional Court has not taken place in Italy or Spain. In 
Italy, the renewal of the constitutional judges has been more gradual over time and less influenced by 
political developments than in Portugal. Indeed, a third of the judges are elected by the two Chambers 
in joint session and with a qualified majority, well beyond the majority in power – two thirds of the 
members of the Parliament in joint session or three fifths after the third vote (Article 3, const. law no. 
2/1967). A third is appointed by the President of the Republic, a super partes institution and the 
political guarantor of the Constitution, and the remaining third by the higher Courts. Although the 
financial crisis and the constitutionalization of the balanced budget clause have certainly affected the 
case law of the Court on Euro-crisis law, there have not been unexpected revirements. Moreover, even 
if there has been disagreement within the Court, it is not possible to ascertain it as no dissenting or 
concurring opinions are permitted. 
Although in Spain dissenting opinions are allowed, they have been used on very few occasions in 
decisions on Euro-crisis law. The Court appears cohesive in its judgments, although its composition 
has completely changed over the last four years. Since the most acute phase of the Eurozone crisis hit 
Spain, starting from 2010, the composition of the Court has been entirely renewed. Such an overall 
transformation in this short period of time does not comply with the wording of the Constitution, 
which provides for the renewal of one third of the judges every three years (Article 159.3 Sp. Const.). 
The deadlock encountered in appointing new judges, in particular by the Parliament, and the end of the 
mandate of previous judges put the Constitutional Court under a serious threat of its activity being 
blocked. When a political agreement was finally found, the only viable solution to preserve the 
operation of the Court was to undertake three renewals of the judges in sequence over three years. It 
should be taken into account that of the twelve constitutional judges, four are elected by the Congress 
                                                     
18 The only exception is Acórdão no. 862/2013, supported by the judges in unanimity. 
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of Deputies and four by the Senate by majorities of three fifths of their members.19 Two judges are 
chosen by the Government and two by the judicial self-governing body. The Government and the 
Parliament, although the latter with qualified majorities, are thus able to control the composition of the 
Constitutional Court. Nine of the twelve judges have been chosen by the present Government and 
Parliament. Apart from other very important elements, like the Eurozone crisis knocking on the 
Spanish door, a landmark decision on budgetary matters issued by the Court in 2011 – before Zapatero 
resigned – and the constitutionalization of the balanced budget clause, also inspired by the above 
precedent, the new composition of the Constitutional Court in line with the new composition of the 
legislative and executive branches can contribute to explaining the very cautious approach of the 
constitutional judges in striking down national legislation. 
(ii) Access to Constitutional Courts 
Most of the judgments of the three Constitutional Courts on Euro-crisis law have been issued 
following abstract review of the measures. Just a few constitutional judgments on Euro-crisis law in 
Italy and Spain – and none in Portugal – have followed a preliminary reference concerning 
constitutionality from an ordinary judge. At the same time, although it is allowed in Spain and 
Portugal – but not in Italy – the constitutionality of international agreements, like the Fiscal Compact 
and the TESM or the Memorandum of understanding following the bailouts, from which many 
provisions of the subsequent Budget Acts directly derived, were not challenged before the 
Constitutional Courts.20 
Very often in the field of Euro-crisis law, Constitutional Courts have not assessed constitutionality on 
the basis of an actual application of the contested norm in a specific case. 21 This kind of review 
directly challenges the legislative output of the Parliaments without testing the effects of a measure in 
its concrete operation. Moreover, abstract review does not usually lead the Courts to develop a rights-
based approach in their rulings, to draw on the catalogue of constitutional rights for the interpretation 
of the constitutional problem at stake, or to address the constitutional issue in the light of protecting a 
particular right. Instead – as is indeed demonstrated by the case law of the three Courts – the abstract 
review of constitutionality pushes constitutional judges either to focus on the division of legislative 
competence and ultra vires activity or to solve the case on the grounds of constitutional principles 
(equality, proportionality, legitimate expectations). Nor is a rights-based approach favoured in Spain 
by the use of the well known recurso de amparo (Article 53 Sp. Const.).22 This is not a viable tool for 
adjudicating Euro-crisis law, first of all because legislative acts – primarily Budget Acts and laws 
implementing structural reforms – cannot be subject to a recurso de amparo, and secondly because a 
violation of social rights – or rather the Principios rectores de la política social y económica (Part I, 
Chapter 3, Sp. Const.) – is not protected by this kind of individual complaint, with the exception of the 
right to education.23 
                                                     
19 The appointees of the Senate are chosen following consultation of the Autonomous Communities. 
20 However, while in Spain the Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy Conditionality and the Financial 
Assistance Facility Agreement were considered international agreements under Spanish law – see M. Estrada-Cañamares, 
G. Gomez Ventura, L. Díez Sánchez, Constitutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law: Spain, EUI Law Department 
Research Project, section X.3, available at http://eurocrisislaw.eui.eu/country/spain/topic/financial-support/ – in Portugal 
the Memorandum of Understanding and the Financial Assistance Facility Agreement were not formally recognized as 
international agreements under Portuguese law (see section III). 
21 It must be taken into account that almost 90% of the cases decided by the Portuguese Constitutional Court deal with a 
concrete review of legislation, i.e. appeals made to the Constitutional Court against the rulings of other courts. See J. de 
Sousa Ribeiro & E. Mealha, ‘Portugal’, cit., p. 733. 
22 On the recurso de amparo, see, for example, F. Fernández Sagado, ‘El regimen jurídico-procesal del recurso de amparo en 
España’, in Id., La justicia constitucional. Una visión de derecho comparado, Tomo III, Madrid, Dykinson, 2009, p. 759 
ff.  
23 As claimed by M. González Pascual, ‘Welfare Rights and Euro Crisis - The Spanish Case’, in C. Kilpatrick and B. de 
Witte (eds.), cit., p. 98, ‘the Spanish legal system does not provide many opportunities for claiming welfare rights in 
courts’.  
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In Italy and Spain, most case law on Euro-crisis law has dealt with disputes between the State and the 
Regions on the exercise of legislative competence on budgetary and social matters.24 In Spain for the 
first time ever, the threshold of 1160 municipalities25 representing at least one sixth of the Spanish 
population was reached to bring an action of unconstitutionality against State legislation for the 
violation of local competences, i.e. conflicto en defensa de la autonomia local (Article 75 ter LOTC). 
Around 3000 municipalities, most of them in Catalunia, succeeded in filing this complaint before the 
Spanish Constitutional Court against State Law 27/2013 on the rationalisation and sustainability of 
Local Administrations because of the strict limits imposed on local authorities and their competences 
in compliance with the principle of budgetary stability. This law determines the status, salaries and 
conditions for hiring employees as well as the range and costs of social services provided.26 The case, 
admissible on 9 September 2014, is now pending before the Court for a decision on the merits of the 
constitutional controversy. 
A significant number of complaints in Spain, and even more so in Portugal, have been filed by 
parliamentary minorities. Especially in Portugal, this kind of action has provided the socialist 
opposition with an effective mechanism to overturn the austerity reforms put forward by the coalition 
government as the subsequent rulings by the Constitutional Court have usually held the norm 
challenged to be unconstitutional. 
It should be highlighted, however, that the most disputed decisions of the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court on Euro-crisis law have been triggered by a significant number of constitutional challenges 
brought by other institutional actors in addition to parliamentary minorities. For example, judgment 
no. 187/2013 was issued on the basis of challenges filed by the President of the Republic, by the 
Ombudsman and by two parliamentary groups.27 This means that the concerns about the 
constitutionality of the measures – concerns that were later endorsed by the Court – were widespread 
at the institutional level and did not only regard one faction in the political spectrum. By the same 
token, the President of the Republic has exercised his power to request a preventive and abstract 
constitutional examination of the austerity measures on several occasions and he has done this more 
frequently than he used to do (Article 278 Pt. Const.). Since under this preventive control a declaration 
of unconstitutionality by the Court prevents the entry into force of the unconstitutional norms, unless 
they are subsequently re-adopted by a super-majority in Parliament,28 the President of the Republic 
usually handles this power with care, since to some extent it is exercised ‘against’ the Parliament. 
                                                     
24 In Italy, the original version of the constitutional bill that later introduced the balanced budget clause entitled the Court of 
Auditors (Article 100 Const.) to challenge the constitutional validity of a legislative act whenever it was deemed to 
violate the balanced budget rule. This provision, however, was eliminated during the parliamentary process of 
constitutional reform between the committee stage and the plenary discussion. Therefore, the chance to have a sort of 
automatic referral to the Constitutional Court of any law that is doubtful on the ground of its compatibility with the 
balanced budget rule has failed. 
25 One seventh of the municipalities existing in the territory where the contested legal provision is applied (Article 75 ter.1 
(b) LOTC). The only case where a conflicto en defensa de la autonomia local against State legislation was declared 
admissible and later on was decided on the merits, was STC 240/2006, 20 July 2006. The conflicto, declared unfounded, 
was a peculiar one, in that it was brought before the Court by the city of Ceuta, which has a peculiar status in Spain, 
against Article 68, State Law 55/1999 referring precisely to this city plan, hence Ceuta was the only municipality to 
which the contested provision could be applied. Instead, in the present conflicto against State Law 27/2013 the whole of 
Spanish territory is potentially affected and this is why thousands of municipalities support the conflict. 
26 See Boletín Oficial del Estado No. 312, of 30 Dec 2012: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2013-13756. 
27 See M. Canotilho, T. Violante & R. Lanceiro, ‘Weak rights, strong principles: Social rights in the Portuguese constitutional 
jurisprudence during the economic crisis’, paper presented on the occasion of the IXth IACL World Congress, Workshop 
4: Social rights and the challenges of economic crisis, Oslo, 17 June 2014, p. 6-7. Article 281.2 Pt. Const. lists the 
subjects who can trigger a (abstract) constitutional review of legislation: the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the 
Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Ombudsman, the Attorney general, one tenth of the members of Parliament, and 
autonomous regions should their autonomy be violated. 
28 A majority that is at least equal to two thirds of all Members present and greater than an absolute majority of all the 
Members in full exercise of their office’ in the unicameral legislature (Article 279.2 Port. Const.). 
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However, in a year and a half – from January 2013 to July 2014 – the President has already requested 
this preventive examination of austerity measures four times, which again indicates very serious 
concerns about the compliance of the legislation passed with the Constitution; concerns that were 
partly shared by the Court in the four cases. 
This overview of access to the three Constitutional Courts can help to explain their case law on Euro-
crisis law, and in particular why the Portuguese Court has so far been more active than the others and 
why a rights-based reasoning has not been developed by these constitutional judges.  
(iii) Timing, effects and types of constitutional judgments 
Within the category of abstract review, the timing of the involvement and the effects of constitutional 
judgments play a great role in terms of the legitimacy of the Courts’ case law, especially when the 
judgments can produce huge financial consequences.29 The rules and the practice that constrain the 
activity of Constitutional Courts in this regard can orient the substance of their judgments. 
For example, in Italy and Spain, the abstract review of constitutionality, which always takes place ex 
post once a law has been finally published in the official journal, can be requested within specific 
deadlines – sixty days after publication in Italy (Article 127 It. Const.) and three months in Spain 
(Article 33, organic law no. 2/1979, Ley Orgánica 2/1979, de 3 de octubre, del Tribunal 
Constitucional, LOTC). The deadline is fixed so as to limit the negative effects of having a law in 
force – and able to produce legal and financial effects, social security cuts or social benefits – which is 
later declared unconstitutional and annulled. To this end, in both Italy and Spain it is possible to ask 
for the suspension of the effects of the contested act when the constitutional challenge is brought 
before the Court. In Italy, a motion for suspension can be filed by both Regions and the State when the 
public interest or citizens’ rights can be severely jeopardized by the effects produced by the law in the 
meantime; in practice such a request has been filed on few occasions and never upheld by the 
Constitutional Court. By contrast, in Spain, where only the national Government can file a motion for 
the suspension of a regional law and the Constitutional Court has to confirm or withdraw the 
suspension in five months, such a suspension has been upheld with regard to some regional austerity 
measures, like those excluding irregular immigrants from the Basque public health system (Auto no. 
239/2012) and increasing the price of medicines (Autos nos. 122/2013 and 142/2013). Particularly in 
this latter case, the suspension allowed the level of the prices to be kept unchanged and avoided having 
to refund citizens for the extra price paid for medicines if the regional laws were found 
unconstitutional, as indeed later happened. 
From the point of view of the relationship between the timing and the effects of constitutional 
judgments, a declaration of unconstitutionality on Budget Acts or on Acts having financial 
implications, like labour markets and pension reforms, can prove to be very problematic, in terms of 
the consequences it can produce for the rights acquired by citizens while the unconstitutional law is in 
force on the one hand, and on the other for the sustainability of public finance. The three Courts cope 
with the issue of the retroactive effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality in the ex post 
constitutional review in different ways. 
Indeed, the ex ante constitutional review does not pose specific problems in this regard. As the 
Portuguese Constitution clarifies, the norm subject to this form of review and which is suspected to be 
unconstitutional is not yet in force at the point when the Court is asked to decide (Article 278 Pt. 
Const.). This can explain why the frequent declarations of unconstitutionality in this proceeding when 
assessing Euro-crisis law do not alter the rights and the living conditions of the people (decisions nos. 
474/2013, 862/2013, 574/2014 and 575/2014). These declarations can negatively affect the 
                                                     
29 In particular on Italy, see Corte costituzionale, Effetti temporali delle sentenze della Corte costituzionale anche con 
riferimento alle esperienze straniere, Milano, Giuffrè, 1989, and T. Groppi, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a 
'Multilevel System' of Constitutional Review?, Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 3, no. 2, 2008, p. 100-117. On Spain, 
see J.J. González Rivas, La interpretación de la Constitución por el Tribunal Constitucional, Madrid, Civitas, 2011, p. 
124-126. 
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relationship between the Court and the Parliament and create concerns vis-à-vis European and 
international institutions if the measure at stake was previously negotiated with them, but there is a 
remedy: in Portugal the measure declared unconstitutional within the ex ante review can be modified 
by the Parliament or even be re-adopted with a qualified majority. Nevertheless before the preventive 
decision of the Court the measure at stake cannot reduce or increase existing wages, pensions or 
allowances. In other words the status of public finance remains unchanged before the Court rules.  
By contrast, in ex post constitutional review the norm reviewed and eventually declared 
unconstitutional is in force, and in the period between its enactment and the Court’s judgment has 
produced legal effects, i.e. has been able to affect revenues and public spending as well as social 
policy.30 As a general rule a declaration of unconstitutionality has retroactive effects (ex tunc).31 
Consequently, existing legal positions built upon the unconstitutional provisions are directly affected. 
The only exception on retroactivity regards the situations that had been ultimately settled according to 
a final judgment or a prescription.32 As can be easily understood, the implications of 
unconstitutionality for the legitimate expectations of people and for the national budget might be 
massive. One would expect, then, that Constitutional Courts should be very careful in striking down 
Euro-crisis law under ex post review.  
In order to contain the retroactive effects of unconstitutionality provided by Article 136 It. Const., the 
Italian Constitutional Court has sometimes adopted ‘supervening declarations of unconstitutionality’ 
or, while ascertaining the unconstitutionality of a norm, the Court has avoided issuing a declaration of 
unconstitutionality because of the retroactive effects produced (judgments nos. 467/1991 and 125-
256/1992). In the few cases since 2010 in which the Italian Court declared legislative provisions 
dealing with pension and allowance cuts unconstitutional while performing the concrete review, i.e. 
through an incidentaliter proceeding (e.g. judgments nos. 223/2012 and 223/2013), it has never 
applied those techniques which allow splitting the content of a declaration of unconstitutionality from 
its effects. Nevertheless the Italian Constitutional Court has usually preferred to uphold the validity of 
the norms under review, being conscious of the drawbacks of its judgments for fiscal policy and 
legitimate expectations of people and given the ‘rigidity’ of Article 136 It. Const.  
In Spain retroactivity of constitutional judgements is even more critical than in Italy because of the 
backlog of the Constitutional Court, although following the reform of the recurso de amparo in 2007 
this backlog has significantly decreased and is now almost under control.33 The short deadline for the 
Regions or the State to file constitutional challenges for an ex post abstract review does not allow for a 
smooth resolution of constitutional conflicts, which remain unsolved for years while the law under 
review is fully in force. It usually takes from 2 to 9 years before a case is decided, although this figure 
has been reduced year after year. With such a delay, it should not come as a surprise that the Court, in 
spite of the general rule on retroactivity, has given itself the power to declare an act unconstitutional ex 
nunc so as to avoid problems with retroactive effects; this power, which is a jurisprudential creation, 
has been used with extreme care in the last few years and during the Euro-crisis, thus clearly defining 
the limits. Because of the delay in the adjudication, the Court has not decided many cases dealing with 
Euro-crisis law yet and, in the cases decided on the merits, whenever possible it has refrained from 
annulling austerity measures, given the duties and the benefits created by the law in the meantime 
                                                     
30 On the effects of the difference between ex ante and ex post constitutional review on judicial behaviour, but in the specific 
case of the ratification of European Treaty revisions, see C. Closa, ‘National Higher Courts and the Ratification of EU 
Treaties’. West European Politics, 36 (1), 2013, p. 116-117.  
31 On the significance of the temporal effects of constitutional judgments in order to assess the implications of a Court’s case 
law, see P. Popelier et al., ‘The Effect of Judicial Decisions in Time: Comparative Notes’. In P. Popelier et al. (eds.), The 
Effects of Judicial Decisions in Time, Intersentia, 2013, p. 1-13  
32 However, if the unconstitutional norm grounded a final criminal judgment of conviction, then the effects of a conviction 
come to an end. 
33 See Tribunal Constitucional de España, Memoria 2013, available at  
     http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/tribunal/memorias/Paginas/memoria_2013.aspx, p. 59-60 and Annex III. 
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(Article 161.2 Sp. Const.). The cautious approach is confirmed in Sentencia no. 206/2013, where the 
Spanish Constitutional Court declared the Budget for 2009 partially unconstitutional almost five years 
after a constitutional challenge by a parliamentary minority was filed. The Court clarified that the 
declaration of unconstitutionality did not entail retroactive effects upon already established legal 
situations, i.e. those on which a final judgment had been delivered or the administrative situations had 
been settled.34 
By contrast, in Portugal it is the Constitution that provides the Constitutional Court with the authority 
to ‘rule that the scope of the effects of the unconstitutionality or illegality shall be more restricted’ 
than what is prescribed as the general rule of retroactivity and its exception (Article 282.4 Pt. Const.). 
The limitation of the effects of the declared unconstitutionality must be used ‘for the purposes of legal 
certainty, reasons of fairness or an exceptionally important public interest, the grounds for which shall 
be given’.  
The Court has not used this clause consistently over time, very often from 1989 to 1995; never from 
1996 to 2005, and on average once a year since 2006, ranging from 700 to 900 judgments per year. 
Interestingly, precisely when the application of the clause might appear particularly suitable, in the 
adjudication of the Euro-crisis law, the Portuguese Constitutional Court used Article 282.4 Pt. Const. 
only twice, the first being Acórdão no. 353/2012, which found provisions of the Budget Act for 2012 
unconstitutional. Since the Budget Act was already in execution when it was judged (in July 2012), 
and thus the challenged wage cuts for public workers had already been applied, the Court decided to 
limit the legal and financial effects of its judgment. While the Court acknowledged that the suspension 
of the Christmas and holiday allowances together with the 13th and 14th month bonus was in breach of 
the equality principle (Article 13 Pt. Const.), it ordered this suspension, which according to the Budget 
Act was supposed to be temporary, to be maintained in 2012 despite being unconstitutional. 
Otherwise, in the event of a ‘plain’ declaration of unconstitutionality, the State would have been 
forced to give the allowances back to public workers. With this judgment, the financial effects of the 
austerity measures were saved. The ability of the Court to modulate the effects of its decision over 
time limited the disputable implications that could follow a refund to public employees and launched a 
warning to the Parliament not to adopt similar measures in the future.35 Given the financial crisis and 
the rescue package for Portugal, the Court’s warning was not abided by and provisions in subsequent 
Budget Acts were then declared unconstitutional without any suspension of the effects of the 
judgments.  
Recently, the Portuguese Court has decided to restrict the effects of its declaration of 
unconstitutionality again (judgment no. 413/2014), but in a rather different manner to that in the 2012 
ruling. Indeed, the Court held that a further reduction of public salaries was in contrast with the 
principle of equality, but this time did not suspend the effects of its ruling. It only prevented its 
judgment from establishing retroactive effects and the wage cuts were annulled ex nunc starting from 
the date of the ruling – 30 May 2014, i.e. the wage cuts introduced before were not affected. This time, 
the standpoint of the Court appears to be the protection of the level of public salaries for the remaining 
period of execution of the 2014 budget, whereas in 2012 the point of view taken by the Court was that 
of preserving the level of public revenues estimated for the whole fiscal year. 
                                                     
34 Own translation from Spanish. See STC 206/2013, § 3 (h) and (j): ‘Dado el tiempo transcurrido entre la interposición del 
presente recurso y la publicación de esta Sentencia, debemos sin embargo limitar los efectos de la anterior declaración 
de inconstitucionalidad y nulidad, que no afectará por tanto a las situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, es decir, no sólo 
las decididas con fuerza de cosa juzgada, sino también las situaciones administrativas firmes, según hemos decidido en 
casos similares atendiendo a estos mismos intereses’. 
35 On the Courts’ strategies to modulate the effects of their judgments over time as an effective tool against the rigidity of the 
simple annulment of a norm on the one hand, and the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality devoid of a 
consequential annulment on the other, as has sometimes occurred in Spain – although not in the recent judgments on 
Euro-crisis law – see X. Magnon, ‘La modulation des effets dans le temps des décisions des juges constitutionnels’. 
Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, XXVII, 2012, p. 566 ff. 
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However, if on the one hand modulation of the temporal effects of judgments gives the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court leeway to determine the scope of its rulings exactly, on the other hand this 
technique appears to create much confusion. 
Following decision no. 413/2014, the Portuguese Parliament, as the institution that had passed the 
contested Budget Act 2014, referred several questions to the Court seeking clarification on the 
temporal effects of this judgment. Some practical aspects of the implementation of the Court’s 
decision about the quantification of the holiday allowance and the timing of its payment remained 
unclear according to the Parliament, which was in charge of following up the ruling. However, the 
Court stated that any ambiguity in the implementation of the judgment did not derive from the text of 
the judgment itself. The Constitutional Court is not a legislator and it is beyond its mandate to define 
the aspects requested, which concern the administrative competence of the Government and the 
exercise of a rule-making power. Nor, according to the Court, could the principle of inter-institutional 
cooperation be invoked by the Parliament to this end. Thus, the doubts remained unsolved and the 
judgment proves how difficult the relationship between the political institutions and the Constitutional 
Court is in the current circumstances. 
There is a final element to be taken into consideration about the timing and effects of constitutional 
judgments on Euro-crisis law. Particularly in this field, a timely decision by the Constitutional Court 
can make a difference. As remarked, if a legislative provision raising taxes or providing social benefits 
is annulled before or immediately after its entry into force, the effects of such a decision are not so 
disruptive for the legal system and for individuals. Once they have been referred to, the Italian and the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court decide on average no more than 10 months later. Although in 
Portugal there is no deadline for the ex post abstract review of constitutionality, it always happens that 
a constitutional challenge is lodged almost immediately after the entry into force of the law at stake, 
and it is promptly judged, as the relevant case law shows. By contrast, as highlighted for Spain, the 
amount of time elapsing between the referral to the Constitutional Court and the judgment on the 
merits, if any, irremediably undermines the effectiveness of constitutional review and forces 
constitutional judges either to uphold the validity of the norm or to declare the effects of 
unconstitutionality ex nunc, although the latter hypothesis was not really applied in the few judgments 
on Euro-crisis law. 
(iv) Standards for constitutional review 
The three Constitutional Courts manage rather different standards of constitutional review of matters 
relevant to Euro-crisis law, in particular about the protection of social rights, which are severely 
affected by austerity measures and the violation of which is indeed often claimed before the Courts, 
and about the presence of a balanced budget clause, if any, in the Constitution, which could orient the 
position of the constitutional judges. 
The Portuguese and the Italian Constitutional Courts can rely on rich catalogues of constitutional 
rights, which also include social rights (Articles 29 to 34 of the Italian Const. and Articles 63 to 72 of 
the Port. Const.).36 This might lead to an expectation of a development of constitutional case law 
oriented towards a strong protection of rights, even during the crisis. However, partly for reasons 
already pointed out – access to the Constitutional Court in Italy – and partly for reasons that will be 
highlighted below – i.e. the constitutionalization of the balanced budget clause in Italy, the 
composition of the Court, and consistency with previous case law in Portugal – social rights are not 
valued by these two Constitutional Courts as much as may initially be expected.  
                                                     
36 In particular, the Portuguese Constitution, which entered into force in 1976, protects a wide variety of social rights, which 
even include the right to housing (Article 65), the right to childhood (Article 69), the rights of disabled citizens (Article 
71) and the rights of the elderly (Article 72).  
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The catalogue of rights in the Spanish Constitution is far more limited37 and, for example, the status of 
social rights, except for the right to education, remains uncertain. The Constitution defines most of 
them as ‘principios rectores’ (guiding principles) of social and economic policy’.38 According to 
Article 53 Sp. Const., principios rectores are principles guiding legislation, judicial practice and the 
activity of public authorities. The same strength is not acknowledged to them as fundamental rights, 
which are also protected by the recurso de amparo before the Constitutional Court. As the Court itself 
has clarified (judgment no. 80/1982), however, these guiding principles – among them are the 
protection of health care and of social security – cannot be considered mere indications for public 
powers and challenging a law that violates them by means of constitutional review of legislation is 
allowed. In spite of this achievement, it cannot be ignored that the guarantees to enforce Spanish 
guiding principles in the fields of social and economic policy are less effective than those for social 
rights in Italy and Portugal because of the constitutional text. 
A second significant element to orient the reading of the constitutional case law of the three Courts is 
the presence of a balanced budget clause in the Constitution. If such a clause is present, the Court 
cannot underestimate the balance between public revenues and expenditures when constitutional rights 
may be affected for this purpose.  
For example, the Portuguese Constitutional Court does not have this ‘burden’ in the Constitution, 
although being a (bailout) Eurozone country it cannot completely neglect the obligations of fiscal 
stability imposed by EU and international norms. In Portugal, for political reasons it was not possible 
to reach the two-thirds majority required to pass a constitutional amendment and constitutionalize the 
balanced budget rule (Article 286 Pt. Const.). In order to fulfil the obligations prescribed by the fiscal 
compact (Art. 3) – to embed the balanced budget rule into a law having a reasonably high expectation 
of endurance – the Portuguese unicameral Parliament passed an amendment to the budgetary 
framework law (law no. 37/2013). It does not appear that the amendment t really matches the 
requirement of Article 3 of the fiscal compact. The framework law can be reformed by a simple 
majority at any time, although Article 112. 3 Pt. Const. acknowledges a superior force to the 
framework law. Indeed, as with any other framework law, law no. 37/2013 is a standard for the 
Constitutional Court to review the legality of ordinary legislation (Article 280.2a, Pt. Const.).  
Nonetheless, the lack of a constitutional balanced budget clause is not a minor element when 
analyzing constitutional case law and this is mirrored in the judgments of the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court, which has not hesitated to strike down austerity measures requested by the 
rescue package, in spite of the strict conditionality to which Portugal was subject until May 2014. 
By contrast, Italy and Spain constitutionalized the balanced budget rule in 2011 and in 2012 
respectively.39 While these constitutional amendments were well accepted by the political parties – 
with a few exceptions – they were criticized by some scholars from procedural and substantial points 
of view. On the substance of these reforms which is particularly relevant to this analysis, it can be 
pointed out that in both countries there were academic opinions that considered a balanced budget rule 
already entrenched – in the Italian Constitution and in the Spanish legal system. In Italy, such a 
reading of the Constitution derives from a particular interpretation of Article 81.4 Const. – before the 
                                                     
37 According to Article 10.2 Span. Const., ‘Provisions relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognized by the 
Constitution shall be construed in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties 
and agreements thereon ratified by Spain’. Although international and European Treaties on fundamental rights, like the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU, complement the 
standard for constitutional reviews undertaken by the Spanish Constitutional Court within the so-called ‘constitutional 
block’, they have not been applied in the relevant judgments on Euro-crisis law so far.  
38 The right to sufficient remuneration (Article 35 Sp. Const.) and the right to collective bargaining (Article 37 Const.) are not 
considered principios rectores, for instance; they do not enjoy the same protection as the fundamental rights of Article 14 
Sp. Const. and of Chapter 2, Division I, Sp. Const. 
39 It seems worth noting that since 1978 Spain has reformed its Constitution twice, always for EU-related reasons: the first 
time was in 1993 acknowledge rights to European citizens; the second was in 2011 for the constitutionalization of the 
balanced budget clause. 
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2012 reform – which required laws involving new or increased spending to detail the resources 
allocated for that purpose. While this provision has also been used to contain public spending in the 
case law of the Constitutional Court since the 1990s,40 it has never been interpreted by the Court as if a 
balanced budget clause was in force. By contrast, since the entry into force of the constitutional reform 
of 2012 and in spite of the fact that the balanced budget clause has only been in operation since 
January 2014, the Constitutional Court has started to refer more and more often to the compelling 
interest in having a balanced budget and sound public accounts. Although the new clause could not be 
officially used as a standard for constitutional review until 2014, constitutional case law has 
nonetheless been inspired by it being in the background of the Court’s reasoning. 
The opposite occurred in Spain. A balanced budget requirement was already in force in this country 
for all public administrations (state, regional and local), although it was not embedded in the 
Constitution. Law no. 18/2001 (Ley General de Estabilidad Presupuestaria) and Organic law no. 
5/2001 (Ley Orgánica complementaria a la Ley General de Estabilidad Presupuestaria), as 
subsequently modified, fixed an obligation of a balanced budget for the public sector. The 
Constitutional Court in its judgment on the law and the organic law of 2001 also upheld their 
constitutionality and the duty to maintain balanced budgets (decision no. 134/2011) on 20 July 2011, 
two months before the constitutional reform was finally approved. To some extent, this case law 
anticipated the reform, which was adopted with the purpose of providing a clear anchoring of the 
balanced budget into the Constitution and of setting a new and long-lasting standard of constitutional 
review of legislation (Article 135 Sp. Const.).41 The reform will be fully implemented only in 2020 – 
which is with a delay of more than nine years from its approval – and meanwhile a gradual 
enforcement of the new standard is provided on the basis of temporary objectives for the reduction of 
the public deficit and debt. In spite of this long transitional period, the Constitutional Court has 
explicitly stated that following the constitutional acknowledgment of the principle of a balanced 
budget, this principle has become standard in its constitutional review based on the doctrine of the ius 
superveniens (decision no. 157/2011, § 3, 18 October 2011). Thus, the delayed implementation of the 
reform does not prevent the prompt operation of its most important clause. 
The constitutionalization of the balanced budget rule was also an opportunity to insert other provisions 
into the Italian and Spanish Constitutions; for example, about a debt ceiling, about reference to EU law 
to determine the exceptional circumstances which allow derogation from a medium-term objective, 
and to clarify at the constitutional level the fiscal responsibilities of the State and the 
Regions/Autonomous Communities. All public administrations are bound to follow the new rule – 
according to the new versions of Articles 81, 97 and 117 It. Const. and to Article 135 Sp. Const. – and 
the reference to the EU law is likely to play an important role in the future enforcement of the clause. 
It should be highlighted that until 2011 EU law was not even mentioned in the Spanish constitutional 
text and the Court had always refused to consider EU norms as standards of constitutional review 
(decision no. 28/1991). However, as the debt and deficit limits set by Article 135 are now to be 
implemented ‘in accordance with EU law’, relevant EU norms cannot be neglected by the 
Constitutional Court. This Court often refers to EU law in general in its judgments on Euro-crisis law, 
although it usually avoids mentioning specific EU legal provisions to ground its decisions (Sentencia 
no 206/2013). It can be said then that EU law is used as a ‘veiled’ standard. 
In Italy it appears that a similar outcome to that in Spain has been caused by the constitutional reform, 
with a high number of generic references to EU law in the constitutional judgments on Euro-crisis law. 
Normally, EU law is not a standard for constitutional review by the Court although it can be in a few 
cases. The most frequent of these is that of a constitutional challenge brought by the Regions or by the 
State about a possible violation of EU law by a national legislative provision. Indeed, in decisions nos. 
60/2013 and 39/2014 the Italian Constitutional Court affirmed that compliance with EU obligations 
directly originated not only from the fundamental principles of coordination of public finance, which 
                                                     
40 See C. Colapietro, La giurisprudenza costituzionale nella crisi dello Stato sociale, Padova, Cedam, 1996.  
41 J. García Roca & M. Á. Martínez Lago, Estabilidad Presupuestaria …, cit., p. 63-65. 
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are binding upon the Regions, but also from Article 117.1 It. Cost.42 and Article 2.1 of Constitutional 
Law no. 1/2012. In particular, according to the Court, the new first section of Article 97 It. Const., 
‘reminds all public administrations to guarantee balanced budgets and the sustainability of public debt 
according to the EU legal system’.43 
The remaining two remote hypotheses in which EU law can be used as a standard of constitutional 
review by the Italian Court are: that of a national law that is found to be in breach of a non-self-
executing EU norm by an ordinary judge, who, however, almost always first issues a preliminary 
reference to the Court of Justice of the EU; and that in which violation of the fundamental principles 
of the Constitution – controlimiti – is triggered by an EU norm; a case that in practice has never 
happened in Italy.44 
A similarly hesitant approach to including EU law as a standard in constitutional adjudication has been 
taken by the Portuguese Constitutional Court. In principle, the Court can apply EU as well as 
international norms as canon for the constitutional review of legislation: however, so far the Court has 
never used these norms as autonomous sources for assessing the constitutional validity of national 
legislation.45 Portuguese constitutional judges regularly cite EU law and the international law that 
ground the rescue package for Portugal. This reference is made in obiter dicta and cases are always 
solved on the basis of national constitutional provisions. Instead, many judgments of the Court about 
Euro-crisis law, which have also led to the renegotiation of certain conditions of the Financial and 
Economic Assistance Programme, reveal that the Court does not hesitate to deviate from EU and 
international obligations when they can encroach upon ‘the fundamental principles of a democratic 
state based on the rule of law’, the only limit set by Article 8.3 Pt. Const. to the implementation of EU 
law.46  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN A TIME OF EURO-CRISIS: CONTINUITY VS 
INNOVATION 
In the following paragraphs, an assessment is carried out of the elements of continuity and innovation 
in the case law of the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish Constitutional Courts on Euro-crisis law. The 
focus is on two case studies, social rights and regional autonomy, and on the constitutional reasoning 
applied by the Courts to ground their decisions. Given the fact that, according to many scholars,47 the 
legal measures adopted in reaction to the Eurozone crisis have challenged the persistence of 
                                                     
42 This article states: ‘Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and 
with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations’. 
43 See decision no. 39/2014, § 2. 
44 See M. Cartabia, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and the relationship between the Italian legal system and the European 
Union’, in A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet, J. H. H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court and National Courts - Doctrine 
and Jurisprudence. Legal change in its social context, Oxford-Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 133. The 
constitutional standard for the Italian participation in the European Union can be found in Article 11 and Article 117.1 It. 
Const.  
45 In this regard, see the national report of the Constitutional Court of Portugal submitted for the XVIth Congress of the 
Conference of European Constitutional Courts held in Vienna, May 2014 (November 2013), p. 4, available at 
http://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-kongress/downloads/landesberichte/LB-Portugal-EN.pdf 
46 On this issue, see the latest developments in Portuguese constitutional case law analyzed in section III.C (vi). 
47 See M. Luciani, ‘Unità nazionale e struttura economica. La prospettiva della Costituzione repubblicana’, XXVI Convegno 
annuale dei Costituzionalisti, at http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/bglc/relazione-luciani, p. 65 ff.; C. 
Barnard, ‘The Charter in time of crisis: a case study of dismissal’, in N. Countouris & M. Freedland (eds.), Resocialising 
Europe in a time of crisis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 250 ff., R. Ruiz-Rico Ruiz, ‘Actuales 
desafíos de la Constitución normativa: el mega-principio de la Estabilidad presupuestaria come respuesta a la crisis 
económica y sus efectos perversos sobre el principio de constitucionalidad’, Instituzioni del federalismo, 2013, 229 ff., A. 
Morrone, ‘Crisi economica e diritti. Appunti per lo stato costituzionale in Europa’, Quaderni costituzionali, no 1, 2014, p. 
79 ff., and I. Pernice, ‘Domestic Courts, Constitutional Constraints and European Democracy: What Solution for the 
Crisis?’, in M. Adams, F. Fabbrini & P. Larouche (eds.) The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints, 
Oxford, Hart. Publishing, 2014, p. 297 ff. 
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constitutional principles, like the rule of law, democracy, sovereignty and rights protection, one might 
expect a breakthrough in the constitutional judgments of the three Courts. However, this prediction is 
true only in part, as in the constitutional case law of the three jurisdictions elements of continuity with 
the pre-Eurozone crisis phase are also very important. Besides other elements of change, this 
continuity is attributable partly to legal elements – access to the Court and standards of constitutional 
review – and partly to non-legal elements, like the present economic and political situation and the 
composition of the Courts, which differ from one Member State to another. 
III.A Managing ‘social rights’? 
Despite the different conclusions they come to and the different reasons behind this trend, which will 
be highlighted in this section, since 2010 the judgments of the three Constitutional Courts on Euro-
crisis law regarding social rights are in continuity with the pre-crisis case law in several respects, 
although they diverge in some regards.  
Italy 
In Italy, for example, the Constitutional Court has usually been particularly keen to protect social 
rights. In the 1990s, initially with reference to the right to health care (Article 32 It. Const.), the Court 
developed the notion of ‘the essential core of a right’ (decision no. 304/1994) that cannot be 
superseded by any other public interest or competing constitutional value, and subsequently applied 
this notion to other rights. This approach is also confirmed in some decisions on austerity measures 
following the Eurozone crisis. For instance, decision no. 80/2010 considered unconstitutional a 
provision of the State financial act of 2008 that made it impossible for public schools to hire teachers 
for physically impaired students. The hiring was precluded by a cut in public expenditure and was 
justified by the need to limit the deficit. The Court argued, however, that the essential core of the right 
to education is a limit to the action of the Parliament, which does not have discretion on this point.48 
At the same time, at least since the 1990s, the Italian Constitutional Court has acknowledged that its 
judgments can have huge financial implications. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s the Court had 
extensively used particular types of judgment for which it was severely criticized as they caused 
significant growth in public expenditure. Indeed, by means of these ‘additive rulings’ (sentenze 
additive) the Court would declare a law unconstitutional ‘insofar as it did not’ provide for a specific 
norm and the Court itself ‘added’ the missing part of the legislative provisions.49 This kind of decision 
was widely applied in the 1960s and 1970s, aiming to strengthen social protection and welfare and to 
remove violations of the equality principle. In doing this, however, the Court neglected to take into 
account the financial sustainability of its decisions.50 As the management of public accounts went out 
of control while the financial situation started to worsen, at the turn of the 1990s, when the spectre of a 
crisis finally appeared, the Constitutional Court turned to a more cautious approach. In the landmark 
judgment no. 455/1990 the Court developed a ‘balancing test’ to accommodate social rights protection 
with the shortage and distribution of fiscal resources.51 Constitutional judges evaluated the social 
rights at stake in the broader framework of the financial crisis that hit Italy and also with a view to 
making the welfare system sustainable in the years to come and for future generations of workers 
(decisions nos. 99 and 390/1995). The concepts of ‘graduality’ of pension reforms and of ‘conditioned 
                                                     
48 See T. Groppi, I. Spigno & N. Vizioli, ‘The Constitutional Consequences of the Financial Crisis in Italy’, in X. Contiades 
(ed.), Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis. A Comparative Analysis, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, p. 109. 
49 See S. Scagliarini, La quantificazione degli oneri finanziari delle leggi tra governo, parlamento e Corte costituzionale, 
Milano, Giuffrè, 2006; G. Rivosecchi, L’indirizzo politico finanziario tra Costituzione italiana e vincoli europei, Padova, 
Cedam, 2007 and M. de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe, cit., p. 315.  
50 As mentioned above (section II), Article 81.4 of the It. Const., in its original version, established a constitutional limit to 
public spending by imposing a duty upon the Parliament and the Government to indicate the fiscal means of funding 
legislation that either increases public spending or decreases revenues. However, the Constitutional Courts’ rulings can 
also increase public spending, but the Court appeared to disregard these financial effects. 
51 See D. Tega, ‘Welfare Rights in Italy’, Social Rights in Time of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’s 
Challenges, cit., p. 54. 
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rights’ were also developed by the Court (decision no. 455/1990).52 As in the 1990s, the concept of 
‘conditioned right’ has been applied in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, for example to declare the 
guarantee of medical assistance as a financially conditioned right the protection of which depends on 
the resources available (decision no. 248/2011). 
Likewise, in the wake of the Euro-crisis, the ‘balancing test’ was used by the Italian Constitutional 
Court to limit social rights in a case on the calculation of the pensions of cross-border workers 
between Italy and Switzerland (decision no. 264/2012, § 5.3). A retroactive legislative act of 
‘authentic interpretation’ established that for the purpose of calculating the pension of these cross-
border workers the salary earned in Switzerland had to be re-adjusted on the basis of the actual level of 
Swiss contributions rather than on that of the Italian contributions. This resulted in lower pensions 
than expected. The European Court of Human Rights, in the case Maggio and others v. Italy of 31 
May 2011 (applications nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08), had already 
declared the legislative act of ‘authentic interpretation’ to be in breach of Article 6.1. of the ECHR. 
The Constitutional Court, however, in spite of this ECHR judgment, confirmed the validity of the 
legislative act:53 the appellants did not have a legitimate expectation of a pension calculated according 
to the more favourable treatment and the ‘authentic interpretation’ provided was inspired by the 
principle of equality and solidarity. Indeed, according to the Constitutional Court: 
‘the effects of the said provision are felt within the context of a pension system which seeks to 
strike a balance between the available resources and benefits paid, also in accordance with the 
requirement laid down by Article 81(4) of the Constitution’ – old version - ‘and the need to ensure 
that the overall system is rational’, thus preventing changes to financial payments to the detriment 
of some contributors and to the benefit of others. In doing so, it guarantees respect for the 
principles of equality and solidarity, which, due to their foundational status, occupy a privileged 
position within the balancing operation against other constitutional values’. 
 
Also in its application of the equality principle (Art. 3 It. Const.) to solve cases on Euro-crisis law the 
Constitutional Court has used a reasoning developed years ago, during the 1990s financial crisis, 
although not always in a consistent manner. In 1997 the Court stated that stringent requirements and 
sacrifices of welfare rights could be seen in compliance with Article 3 It. Const. – under the double 
aspects of substantive equality and reasonableness – provided that they were exceptional, transient, 
non-arbitrary and relevant to the purpose achieved (see decision no. 245/1997 and order no. 
299/1999). On this ground, provisions of decree-laws adopted during the Eurozone crisis with the aim 
of re-distributing resources from the pensions or the incomes of the richest part of the population in 
favour of the poorest have been declared unconstitutional on some occasions and in conformity with 
the Constitution on others.54 
Decree-law no. 78/2010 blocked the salary adjustment mechanism for magistrates and reduced their 
special allowance as a form of ‘solidarity contribution’, based on the fact that these workers already 
benefited from high levels of income. The Court considered the reduction of the allowance a form of 
taxation and declared it in contrast with the Constitution because it violated the principle of equality 
(Article 3) and Article 53, about the progressive nature of the tax system (decision no. 223/2012). The 
test developed in 1997 was applied here but was not successfully passed by the contested austerity 
measure and Article 9.2. of the decree-law was declared unconstitutional (§ 11.5). The breach of the 
principle of equality depended on the introduction of a measure that was targeted at a specific group of 
                                                     
52 See R. Bin, Diritti e argomenti, Milano, Giuffrè, 1992, p. 107 ff.   
53 The Italian Constitutional Court highlighted the fact that ‘in contrast to the European Court, this Court carries out a 
systemic and not an isolated assessment of the values affected by the provisions reviewed from time to time, and is 
therefore required to carry out that balancing operation, which falls to this Court alone’. 
54 Article 77 It. Const. allows the Government to adopt decree-laws with immediate effect in extraordinary cases of necessity 
and urgency and they are to be converted, and if necessary amended, into a parliamentary act, within 60 days of their 
enactment. Otherwise, they lose their effects ex tunc. There are no limitations for the adoption of decree-laws in terms of 
subject-matter, except for issues to be provided for by constitutional law. 
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people – magistrates – whose independence and neutrality also derives from their income, and 
imposed upon them a deterioration of their living conditions. Moreover, according to the Court, the 
benefit to the public accounts of the reduction imposed upon the magistrates’ allowance was 
minimal.55  
On 17 December 2013, the Constitutional Court again ruled on the constitutionality of Decree-law no. 
78/2010, in particular about the freezing of the salary adjustment mechanism for non-contracted 
people working in the public sector (decision no. 310/2013).56 The freezing of the salary adjustment 
mechanism was not considered a form of taxation57 and it appeared a reasonable sacrifice to restore 
sound public accounts in the present economic crisis (§ 11). In addition, in the case at stake there were 
no exemptions to be invoked (decision no. 223/2012), like the special position of independence of the 
magistrates to be protected in the constitutional system (§ 13.1). It should be highlighted that judgment 
no. 310/2013 was much more balanced compared to decision no. 223/2012. The former avoided 
extending the preferential treatment questionably reserved to magistrates to other interested groups of 
workers that, from time to time, struggle to preserve their ‘privileges’ in spite of the lack of resources 
and the principle of solidarity. Therefore, in decision no. 310/2013 the Court tried to step back from its 
previous disputable orientation and to make an overall balancing between the social rights of specific 
groups and the sustainability of the welfare system for the benefit of all citizens. This approach has 
been further confirmed in other more recent judgments, nos. 7 and 154/2014: the freezing of the salary 
adjustment was deemed in compliance with the Constitution by applying the test developed in 1997. 
This measure was considered reasonable as it was transient and justified in the light of mandatory 
requirements to contain public spending. In this framework, the exercise of legislative discretion by 
the Parliament was functional for the fundamental needs of the economic policy and prevailed over a 
competing constitutional value (decision no. 154/2014, § 5.3). 
All these rulings of the Italian Constitutional Court dealing with social rights were issued in the 
framework of a preliminary reference for constitutionality by ordinary judges and indeed it is this 
incidentaliter proceeding that favours a more rights-based style of reasoning by the Court. The new 
balanced budget clause since January 2014 has never been invoked as a standard for the constitutional 
review of austerity measures to accomplish a balance between this clause, on the one hand, and the 
principle of equality or workers’ rights, on the other. Only in decision no. 310/2013 was a challenge of 
unconstitutionality rejected by using ad adiuvandum – although not as the main ground for the 
decision – new Article 81 Const., not yet in operation in 2013, and Council Directive 2011/85/EU on 
requirements for the budgetary frameworks of the Member States. It is too early to assess whether the 
new balanced budget clause is affecting constitutional case law on social rights in Italy. So far, it 
appears that there is nothing extraordinary in the Italian Court’s case law during the current Euro-crisis 
compared to its previous case law. The Court relies on its precedents developed in the 1990s even in a 
period of serious deterioration of public accounts and of financial crisis. 
 
 
                                                     
55 Judgment no. 223/2012 has been severely criticized by scholars for the preferential treatment reserved to magistrates. See, 
for example, D. Piccione, ‘Una manovra governativa di contenimento della spesa «tra il pozzo e il pendolo»: la 
violazione delle guarentigie economiche dei magistrati e l'illegittimità di prestazioni patrimoniali imposte ai soli 
dipendenti pubblici’, Giurisprudenza costituzionale, n. 5, 2012, p. 3353ff. Nevertheless, this decision set a precedent for 
subsequent decisions no. 241/2012 and no. 116/2013, the latter on Decree-law n. 98/2011, which subjected public 
pensions between 90,000 and 150,000 euro to a taxation of 5 per cent of the difference (i.e. 60,000 euro).  
56 In particular, Article 9, section 21, of Decree-law no. 78/2010 provides a freezing from 2011 to 2013 of: a) the salary 
adjustment mechanism for the three-year period; b) automatic variations in salary depending on the length of service; c) 
increases in salary subject to career developments. The freezing of the salary adjustment for diplomats provided by 
Decree-law no. 78/2010 was the object of decision no. 304/2013, where the Court came to the same conclusions as in 
judgment no. 310/2013. 
57 No reduction of allowances was introduced by Article 9, section 21 of Decree-law no. 78/2010, contrary to what was also 
disputed in decision no. 223/2012 for magistrates. 
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Spain 
The continuity of the constitutional case law on social rights now dealing with the Eurozone crisis can 
also be detected in Spain, where there has traditionally been weak judicial enforcement of welfare 
rights, the so-called principios rectores of social and economic policy (see section II). The Spanish 
Constitutional Court has not delivered many judgments on Euro-crisis law or social rights/principios 
rectores yet.58 This is partly because of the delay of the Court in deciding on the merits of a case – for 
the reasons explained in section II – once it is declared admissible, and partly on the deferential 
approach of the Court to the Parliament, which often leads the former to declare constitutional 
challenges inadmissible or to dismiss them by providing interpretations in conformity with the 
Constitution of the norm under review at the same time.  
In addition, as has been highlighted, in Spain ‘Regions are in charge of the main social policies’.59 In 
terms of constitutional case law, this means that most judgments affecting the Spanish welfare system 
– and also those in the wake of the Eurozone crisis – are delivered by the Court in the framework of 
constitutional conflicts between the State and regional legislation, in which a rights-based reasoning is 
usually avoided, as the main focus is on the correct allocation of legislative powers between levels of 
government. Although there are exceptions, this constitutional arrangement has not favoured an 
expansion of social rights protection. 
All these elements help understand why in Spain there are only a few judgments on the implications of 
Euro-crisis law for social rights, and consequently why the Court’s most recent judgments in this field 
have remained consistent with the case law developed before the financial crisis. 
So far, the constitutional challenges on Euro-crisis law brought by means of a preliminary reference of 
constitutionality have been declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court.60 Given the nature of 
the challenges, which have originated from the concrete application of Euro-crisis measures, usually 
against welfare rights, a preliminary reference of constitutionality could lead the Court to develop a 
rights-based reasoning, provided that challenges are declared admissible.  
One of the references dealt with Decree-law no. 8/2010, which reduced public salaries in violation of 
an existing collective agreement and was thus deemed to violate the constitutional limits for enacting 
decree-laws (Article 86.1 Sp. Const.).61 Amongst these limits is the protection of fundamental rights. 
The judge who filed the constitutional challenge referred to the right to collective bargaining (Article 
37 Sp. Const.) in connection with the right to freely join a trade union (Article 28.1 Sp. Const.), 
although the former is not treated as a fundamental right by the Spanish Constitution. The Court did 
not linger on the fundamental rights question or on what can be included or excluded from the limits 
set in Article 86.1. Const. because the preliminary reference was found to be procedurally 
inadmissible (Auto 85/2011).62  
                                                     
58 See A. Ruiz Robledo, The Spanish Constitution in the Turmoil of the Global Financial Crisis, in X. Contiades (ed.), 
Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis. A Comparative Analysis, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, p. 141 ff. 
59 See M. González Pascual, ‘Welfare Rights And Euro Crisis - The Spanish Case’, cit., p. 96.  
60 According to Article 37.1 LOTC, a reference is inadmissible when it does not meet the procedural requirements provided 
by law (e.g. the nature of the body that makes the reference, how the order of reference is drafted, etc.) or when the 
challenged violation of the Constitution is patently non-grounded. 
61 Article 86 Sp. Const. allows the Government to issue temporary legislative provisions (decree-laws) in the case of an 
extraordinary and urgent need and they are to be immediately submitted to debate and vote by the Parliament. Within 
thirty days of the promulgation of a decree-law, the Parliament may convert it into law or repeal it. Moreover, the decree-
law ‘may not affect the legal system of the basic State institutions, the rights, duties and freedoms of the citizens 
contained in Part 1, the system of Autonomous Communities, or the general electoral law’.  
62 The Court went directly to the point of the incorrect way of proceeding on the part of the judge who made the referral to 
the Constitutional Court, as the proposed standard of review – Article 86.1 Sp. Const. – was not communicated by this 
judge to the parties, while it was cited only in the order of referral to the Constitutional Court. The second question that 
was posed to the Court in the preliminary reference of constitutionality did not directly deal with social rights – namely 
whether the violation of a collective agreement by a decree-law entailed a violation of Article 9.3 Sp. Const. with respect 
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The self-restraint of the Court in the adjudication of Euro-crisis law affecting social rights is 
confirmed by Auto 113/2011. This case dealt with a very complicated issue in Spain, right protection 
in mortgage eviction, a problem that is affecting thousands of families as a consequence of the 
financial crisis. According to Spanish law, if a contractual term in a mortgage is unfair and illegal, 
compensation may be granted, but in a separate proceeding from the mortgage enforcement 
proceeding, which forces the owners to move out of their house anyway. Thus the change in house 
ownership takes effect in any event if the mortgage is not paid, without the legality of the mortgage 
contract being assessed in the same enforcement proceeding. Eventually, a different legal action can 
be undertaken seeking compensation for the unfair or illegal contractual requirements of the mortgage. 
In other words, the court in charge of the enforcement proceedings cannot grant interim relief. The 
judge who filed a preliminary reference for constitutionality detected a violation of Article 9.3 Sp. 
Const., on the prohibition of arbitrary action by public authorities, of Article 24.1 Sp. Const., on the 
right to effective judicial protection, and of Article 47 Sp. Const., on the right to enjoy decent and 
adequate housing. However, the Constitutional Court declared the preliminary reference inadmissible 
as the order of referral was on the one hand too generic and abstract to evaluate whether the 
challenged provisions were really relevant to the main proceedings, and on the other hand the order 
questioned the constitutionality of the system in place for executing mortgages and proposed an 
alternative regime. In this regard, the majority of the Constitutional Court found the order of referral to 
go beyond its remit, as an ordinary judge cannot invade the competence of the Parliament by putting 
forward a new legislative scheme and neither can constitutional judges be asked to assess the validity 
of this new (judicial) solution. It is only for the legislative power to decide on the Code of Civil 
Procedure and thus the issue was treated as a ‘political question’.  
However, in this case a concurring opinion was delivered by Justice Eugeni Gay Montalvo. While he 
agreed with the majority of the Court that the constitutional challenges were not relevant to solving the 
main proceeding, he argued that the case before the Court deserved a more weighted evaluation in the 
light of the social and constitutional significance of the problems at stake. The Court ruled without 
taking the broader context of the financial crisis into account and neglecting that the regulation of 
mortgages, even in these tragic circumstances, had to comply with constitutional principles and values. 
According to Justice Gay Montalvo, the Court should not rely on its previous case law on mortgage 
contracts, developed more than thirty years ago (judgment no. 41/1981) under completely different 
economic and social conditions.63 The new factual elements deriving from the financial crisis should 
have an impact on constitutional interpretation and justified a deviation from previous case law, 
according to the concurring opinion.  
Exactly on the same day that the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled the constitutional challenge 
inadmissible, a Spanish court requested a preliminary reference for interpretation to the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) about the compliance of Spanish mortgage legislation with Directive 
93/13/CEE on unfair terms in consumer contracts. Two years later, on 14 March 2013, the CJEU ruled 
in the Mohamed Aziz case (C-415/11) that Spanish legislation – namely Articles 695 and 698 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure – was in breach of the right of debtors to effective legal protection and 
subsequently national courts should suspend ongoing evictions.64 Interestingly, the Court of Justice of 
(Contd.)                                                                   
of the hierarchy of legal provisions – but was equally declared inadmissible as ungrounded. An act having the same force 
as a law, like a decree-law, prevails over a collective agreement signed by the Government and the trade unions. 
63 L. Díez Sánchez, ‘Deconstitutionalisation of Social Rights and the Quest for Efficiency’, in C. Kilpatrick & B. de Witte, 
cit., p. 118, points out that the Spanish Constitutional Court ‘decided the issue on the grounds of the traditional priority of 
mortgage foreclosures, which dates back to 1872’. 
64 The judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU was actually much more nuanced in terms of right protection, as the issue 
of legal protection was mentioned only in § 62 and the Charter of fundamental rights was not even cited.  
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the EU has provided a superior level of protection to Spanish debtors dealing with unfair mortgage 
contracts during the Eurozone crisis than the Spanish Constitutional Court.65  
The reticent approach of this Constitutional Court to protecting welfare rights was recently confirmed 
in Auto 136/2014. This case dealt with the suspect retroactivity of the elimination of the Christmas 
allowance for public workers,66 thus entailing a violation of Article 9.3 Sp. Const. The preliminary 
reference of constitutionality brought by Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Asturias was held 
inadmissible. The reasoning of the Court resembles that used in Auto 85/2011, as the procedural 
requirements for the admissibility of the preliminary question were not matched. In particular, the 
referring court did not disclose in advance to the parties – among them was a trade union – of the main 
proceedings the object of the constitutional challenge and the standard of constitutional review in 
order to let them react.  
All in all, this consistent approach of the Court, in spite of the changing economic and social context, 
can be explained by the entrenchment of the balanced budget clause in the Constitution and by the 
subsequent acknowledgment – as ius superveniens – of new Article 135 Sp. Const. as a standard of 
review also applying to pending cases (judgment no. 206/2013).67 
However, in the difficult times of the financial crisis the protection of welfare rights in Spain could 
potentially be enhanced through the case law of the Constitutional Court on the conflict of 
competences between the State and Regions. Although the Court has not yet ruled on the merits of the 
cases, it is likely that regional laws enhancing the protection of the right to health care (Article 43 Sp. 
Const., on the Principios rectores) compared to the standard set by the State will be upheld. In two 
cases (Auto no. 239/2012 and no. 114/2014) the Court had to decide to maintain or to withdraw the 
suspension of the effects of regional laws of the Basque country and of Navarra that had been 
challenged by the national government on the ground of a violation of the framework legislation 
(legislación básica) on access to public health assistance (Article 149.1.16 Sp. Const.). As mentioned 
(section II), as soon as a regional law has been challenged, the national government has the authority 
to ask the Constitutional Court to suspend the effects of that law, especially when it entails significant 
financial implications, while waiting for the Court’s final  decision (Article 161.2 Sp. Const. and 64 
LOTC).  
Compared to the State framework legislation, the two regional laws removed the existing legal 
boundaries to the access of all residents in their territory to free public health care. Under the State 
framework law, for example, undocumented adult immigrants cannot benefit from the public health 
care services unless an emergency situation occurs – basically when a life is in serious danger.68 The 
regional legislation, by contrast, included them with the extra cost being paid from the regional 
budget. Competing interests have to be balanced: on the one hand, as the government claimed, the 
regional legislation impairs the financial sustainability of the national health care system, as shaped by 
                                                     
65 Indeed, H.-W. Micklitz & N. Reich, ‘The Court And Sleeping Beauty: The Revival Of The Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive (UCTD)’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 51, 2014, p. 771–808, p. 800 ff. about the Mohamed Aziz case, 
speak about a ‘hidden constitutionalization’ of private law. 
66 See Article 2 of the Real Decreto-ley 20/2012, de 13 de julio, de medidas para garantizar la estabilidad presupuestaria y 
de fomento de la competitividad. 
67 In judgment no. 206/2013, on the Budget Act for 2009, as in other rulings of the Spanish Constitutional Court, Article 135 
was invoked by the referring judge as a standard for constitutional review besides other standards and the Constitutional 
Court made reference to the constitutional reform and to the past and the current version of Article 135, but the case was 
not solved on the ground of that Article. 
68 In decision no 269/2010 the Italian Constitutional Court, usually very reticent to confirm the validity of regional legislation 
that causes a growth in public expenditure, nevertheless upheld the constitutionality of a regional law that also recognized 
the right to health care for illegal immigrants, at least as regards non-deferrable and urgent medical treatment. Otherwise, 
the irreducible core of the right to health care would have been denied. 
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the contested national decree-laws passed in 2010 and 2012;69 on the other hand, there is the protection 
of the right to health care of the most vulnerable individuals as well as of public health, which can be 
jeopardized by a lack of access to the public health service of a part of the population.  
In order to decide on the suspension, the Spanish Constitutional Court elaborated on the protection of 
health care, which it found to be based on the connection between the principio rectore of Article 43 
Sp. Const. and Article 15 Sp. Const., the fundamental right to life and to physical and moral integrity 
as recognized by the European Court of Human Rights. The weak enforcement of a principio rectore 
was strengthened thanks to the joint reading with a fundamental right, as interpreted in the framework 
of the Council of Europe. 
In both cases, the suspension of regional laws was withdrawn, as according to the Court the rights 
acknowledged and the desirability of preventing risks affecting public health do have a special 
significance in the Spanish constitutional framework and cannot be affected by mere economic 
calculations and prospective savings in public expenditure (Auto no. 239/2012). This statement grants 
priority to social rights over the economic rationale in the context of the financial crisis in the Court’s 
reasoning. In addition, the withdrawal of the suspension of the effects could suggest that the Court is 
willing to dismiss the State constitutional challenges about access to free public health care services 
when it eventually decides on the merits.70 
In both cases, however, the suspension of the regional legislative provisions that decreased the 
individual private prescription charge for medicines while at the same time increasing the public 
contribution (the so-called copago) was confirmed. No right-based reasoning was developed by the 
Court and economic data provided by the national government about the negative financial 
implications of regional provisions for public health care expenditure were taken into account. The 
problem of the sustainability of public health care expenditure, of which medical expenditures are a 
significant part, together with the shadow of the financial crisis, led the Court to take a different 
approach on this issue. This latter approach is, however, largely prevalent in the Constitutional Court’s 
case law dealing with the Euro-crisis and delivered in the framework of State-Region constitutional 
conflicts, whereas the standpoint of the Court on exclusion from free public health care services is 
really an exception so far. 
Furthermore, the need to deal with the financial crisis can also lead to a potential conflict between 
welfare rights. This risk is illustrated by the case of the constitutional challenge brought by the 
Parliament of Navarra against the State labour reform of 2012, Law no. 3/2012 (ley de reforma 
laboral). Amongst many other things, the reform extends the duration of the trial period from six 
months to one year (Article 4.3) and assigns to the National Advisory Committee on Collective 
Agreements and to similar bodies at regional level the power to solve conflicts between employers and 
employees when they cannot find an agreement on the application of a collective agreement (Article 
14.1). The Court dismissed the constitutional challenge and made an interpretation in conformity with 
the Constitution by stating that the decisions of the Committee can always be appealed against before 
a court so as to grant full judicial control of them (judgment no. 119/2014 of 16 July 2014). 
What is worth highlighting in this case law is that the reasoning of the Spanish Constitutional Court is 
based on the following assumptions. The labour reform, including the challenged provisions, pursues 
the constitutionally legitimate aim of adapting working conditions to a period of severe financial crisis 
that could even impair the existence of workplaces as a consequence of the closure of many medium-
sized and small companies. Subsequently, the flexibilisation of labour contracts and the non-
application of collective agreements, although the latter is an exceptional measure, find their raison 
d’être in the duty of public powers to guarantee the right to work and thus to preserve existing 
                                                     
69 In the challenge dealing with the Ley foral 8/2013 of Navarra, the national government even invoked a threat to violate 
Spanish obligations towards the EU if the suspension of the effects of law was removed. 
70 Moreover, in Auto no. 239/2012 the Spanish Constitutional Court affirmed that the exercise of legislative competence by 
the Basque country does not encroach upon the State competence, as the former expands the basic level of protection set 
by the latter (§ 4). 
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workplaces (Article 40 Sp. Const.). The conflict between welfare rights that arises in this judgment of 
the Constitutional Court is that, as a reaction to the crisis, the usual safeguards of the right to work 
have to be limited or diminished in order to have this right protected for the greatest number of people 
possible. 
In judgment no 119/2014, the Constitutional Court confirmed its previous case law and stated that the 
Spanish Constitution – Article 37 – does not foresee a specific model of collective bargaining and thus 
the Parliament enjoys a wide discretion on how to regulate it. Once again, the dismissal of the case, 
and again by means of an interpretation in conformity with the Constitution, and the reference to the 
significant powers that the Parliament has in this field testify that the Court has not departed from its 
precedents and from its deferential approach to political bodies. 
Portugal 
Regarding continuity and innovation in constitutional case law, even the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court, in spite to its highly contested rulings and despite some caveats, has developed its case law on 
‘social rights’ during the Eurozone crisis in consistency with its previous judgments on the matter. 
‘Social rights’ are put in quotation marks here because this type of right has been used as a standard 
for the constitutional review of legislation on very few occasions, both before and during the Eurozone 
crisis. Despite the very long and rich list of social rights entrenched in the Portuguese Constitution, the 
judicial enforcement of them, even by the Constitutional Court, has been extremely weak. Where a 
violation of social rights has been contested this Court usually solves cases either on the ground of 
fundamental principles of the democratic state (Acórdão no 3/2010), like the principle of equality, the 
principle of proportionality or the principle of legitimate expectations, which makes it easier to find an 
agreement among the constitutional judges and allows for case-by-case dispute resolution, or on the 
ground of non-written social rights, like the right to a dignified existence (Acórdão no 509/2002).71 
What is new, however, in the constitutional case law dealing with the Eurozone crisis is that the Court 
has often departed from its traditional self-restraint when called on to decide on social entitlements 
and social spending. Its deferential approach towards the legislator usually shown in this field has been 
partially abandoned. This evolution in the rulings of the Portuguese Constitutional Court developed 
gradually, step by step, and the Court launched warnings to the Government and to the Parliament 
before it finally ‘dropped the bomb’ in 2013. Following Acórdão no. 187/13, which might be seen as a 
case of over-reaction by the Court, its rulings on Euro-crisis law have remained more or less stable in 
this regard, pointing to, sometimes latent and other times open, tensions between the Constitutional 
Court and political bodies. 
In the period considered, 2010-2014, many factors can explain this change in the Court’s orientation. 
For example, as described in section II, the composition of the Court in 2010 was completely different 
from the composition of the Court today and the new judicial appointments took place in a period of 
great political instability (section II.A). Meanwhile, the economic situation became worse – which was 
the main cause of political instability. Portugal requested a bailout in 2011 and obtained financial 
assistance in exchange for a more austere fiscal policy. This latter element led to a redistribution of the 
already limited public resources, to the detriment of public workers and pensioners in particular. 
As long as the cuts in social entitlements were linear or the increase in taxation uniform, the Court 
upheld the validity of the measure, taking into consideration the exceptional circumstances of the 
financial crisis and the urgency of the legislative reaction. For example, when in 2010, while Portugal 
was already under an excessive deficit procedure, the Court was asked to decide on the compliance of 
Laws nos. 11/2010 and 12-A/2010 with Article 103 (3) of the Constitution, on the fiscal system, which 
prohibits retroactive legislation, and with the principle of protection of legitimate expectations 
(princípio da confiança), which stems from Article 2 of the Constitution, the majority of the Court 
upheld the validity of the challenged measures (Acórdão no. 399/10 of 26 November 2010). 
According to the Court, there was no authentic retroactivity, the only kind forbidden by the 
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Constitution, and the expectations of tax-payers were not violated insofar as the two laws pursued a 
legitimate aim – to increase resources with the purpose of re-balancing public accounts, they were 
adopted as urgent measures to counteract the financial crisis, and were announced well in advance as 
measures to reduce the public deficit and debt (§ 12.3).72  The Constitutional Court did not undertake 
any scrutiny in the light of the proportionality principle, for example to assess if less restrictive means 
could be used, and thus aligned its position with that of the legislator. 
However, when the Court was asked to decide on wage cuts for public workers in 2011, and thus on 
the way public resources were allocated within the various segments of Portuguese society, the 
constitutional judges tried to set a standard to be applied in future cases to assess whether the cuts 
were consistent with the Constitution. The constitutional challenge was brought against the Budget 
Act for 2011 (Lei do Orçamento de Estado para 2011) whereby cutbacks in public salaries were 
increased from 5 to 10 per cent. Acórdão no 396/2011 of 21 September 2011 was adopted in the pre-
assistance programme regime, although the Memorandum of Understanding was incidentally 
mentioned as a new boundary to be taken into account (§4). Although it was not the first time that 
public salaries were reduced, the particular economic circumstances entailed the threat that public 
wage cuts might become a persistent feature of Portuguese fiscal policy, as the annual Budget Acts 
could confirm the salary reduction year after year, or even increase it. 
The Budget Act for 2011 was challenged before the Court on the grounds of a violation of the 
principle of equality (Article 13 Const.), of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations 
(Article 2 Const.) and of the principle of proportionality (Article 2 Const.). The Court dismissed the 
challenges and confirmed its reticence to enforce social rights: there was no legitimate expectation at 
stake, given the lack of a constitutional right not to have a wage reduction. Moreover, according to the 
Court, public salary cuts were justified on the bases of the transitional nature of the measure, and of 
the existence of a compelling interest to enforce the Growth and Stability Pact and to ensure fiscal 
sustainability by means of the most effective tools to achieve the target as soon as possible. Finally, 
the limitation of public salaries was also justified in the name of the public interest as, unlike private 
workers, public employees are paid with public money. In this ruling, the traditional deferential 
approach of the Court towards the Parliament was confirmed, while at the same time the Court set 
limits for future legislative actions and the path for the development of its case law on the Euro-crisis 
law; standards that indeed have been consistently reaffirmed in almost all constitutional rulings since 
then. Additional sacrifices burdening only civil servants and public pensioners are in compliance with 
the Constitution only if two conditions are cumulatively met: a) alternative measures to reduce public 
spending have been considered by the legislators but were deemed less effective for that purpose; and 
b) the sacrifices required were transitional.  
Interestingly, because of a lack of compliance with these conditions, the dissenting opinions of some 
of the Constitutional Court judges in Acórdão no. 396/2011 – for example Carlos Pamplona de 
Oliveira, who considered the cut-back of public salaries an infringement of the principle of 
proportional equality for public workers and of legal certainty – a few months later grounded the 
majority opinion of the Court in subsequent judgments on Euro-crisis law. 
Thus, in Acórdão no. 353/2012 of 5 July 2012 the Constitutional Court recognized as unconstitutional 
the provisions in the Budget Act for 2012 that suspended the 13th and 14th monthly allowances for 
public workers (and pensioners) from 2012 to 2014 and saw it as an integral part of the salary. By 
applying the test outlined in its ruling of 2011, this suspension amounted to a targeted discrimination 
against public workers. While in 2011 the Court linked the justification of the public salary cuts to the 
particular position of public employees, as their salaries are funded by taxpayers, one year later the 
Court argued that a non-legitimate violation of the principle of equality embedded in Article 13 Const. 
had occurred. The combined effect of the Budget Acts for 2011 and for 2012 led to a persisting 
                                                     
72 See J. E. Machedo, ‘The Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Constitution’s Negative Outlook: A Portuguese Preliminary 
Assessment’, in: X. Contiades (ed.) Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis. A Comparative Analysis, Farnham, 
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impairment of many civil servants’ living conditions. The suspension of the allowances was indeed 
neither temporary, as public workers would have experienced salary cuts for the third year in a row,73 
nor proportionate to the aims to be met. The lack of compliance with the principle of proportional 
equality derived, on the one hand, from the fact that some categories of public employees were 
exempted from the salary cuts without any clear reason, and on the other, the suspension of the 13th 
and the 14th monthly allowances in itself did not substantially contribute to achieving the medium-
term objective.74  
It should be noticed that in this judgment for the first time the Court expressly acknowledged the 
Memoranda of understanding signed by the Portuguese Government during the bailout as legally 
binding according to Article 8.2 Const.75 However, this legal nature of these Memoranda, according to 
some scholars,76 has been put into question as they are not formally international agreements and they 
have not been treated as such in terms of execution in the Portuguese legal system or for the purpose 
of ex ante control of constitutionality, which is allowed for international treaties (Art. 278 Const.). 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court has always confirmed the binding value of the Memoranda and 
                                                     
73 J. Gomes, ‘Social rights in crisis in the Eurozone. Work rights in Portugal’, in C. Kilpatrick and B. De Witte (eds.), cit., p. 
81. 
74 Unlike Decision no. 353/2012 of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, these same provisions of the Portuguese Budget Act 
for 2012 were also subject to review by another Court, the second section of the European Court of Human Rights, on a 
different ground and with different results. See the case Da Conceição Mateus v. Portugal of 8 October 2013 
(Applications nos. 62235/12 and 57725/12). The applicants were two Portuguese pensioners who since 2006 had received 
holiday and Christmas allowances corresponding to a 13th and 14th full monthly pension. By suspending these 
allowances, the Budget Act for 2012 was deemed to impair their living conditions. Although the applicants did not 
invoke any specific provision of the Convention for the protection of fundamental rights, the Court decided to refer to 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 for the possible violation of the right to property. The European Court appreciated the exceptional 
circumstances of crisis under which the Budget Act was passed, also relying on Decision no. 353/2012 of the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court. The rate of the applicants’ basic pensions was left unchanged by the Act and the previous measures 
of the Budget Act for 2011 had proved to be insufficient for the purpose of limiting expenditures. The legislator acted 
within the margin of appreciation and the suspension of the Christmas and holyday allowances was not a disproportionate 
measure given the economic and financial crisis faced by Portugal. No breach of Protocol 1 was detected and the 
application was thus declared ill-founded. The reasoning of the Court was actually grounded on the following statement: 
in this field, “a wide margin of appreciation is usually allowed to the State under the Convention when it comes to 
general measures of economic or social policy. Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the 
national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest on 
social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is “manifestly 
without reasonable foundation”. By contrast, the Portuguese Constitutional Court recognized the provision as 
unconstitutional, although it limited the effects of its declaration of unconstitutionality. The decision of the European 
Court is, in the end, a declaration of deference towards national law. 
Portuguese Budget Acts have also been the object of two preliminary references to the Court of Justice, both issued by the 
labour court of Oporto, in particular to ascertain the compatibility of the provisions of the Budget Acts which provide for 
a reduction in public workers’ salaries and for the non-payment by the State of previously due holiday and Christmas 
allowances with the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU. Both references – the first,  case C-128/2012, Sindicato dos 
Bancários do Norte and Others v BPN with regard to the Budget Act for 2011, and the second, case C-264/2012, 
Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Fidelidade Mundial, on the Budget Act for 2012, were 
dismissed, on 7 March 2013 and on 26 June 2014 respectively, on the basis of a clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice, since the Charter is applicable only in situations which fall within the remit of EU law. While C. Barnard, ‘The 
Charter in Time of Crisis’ in N. Countouris and M. Freedland (eds), Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 250-276, supports the dismissal of the first preliminary reference by 
the Court of Justice in the light of the purely domestic nature of the policy choices included in the Portuguese Budget 
Act. C. Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency’, cit., highlights that ‘a full reconstruction of the 
Portuguese bailout sources actually shows an explicit and tight link between the challenged measure and EU sources’. 
75 ‘Estes memorandos são vinculativos para o Estado Português, na medida em que se fundamentam em instrumentos 
jurídicos – os Tratados institutivos das entidades internacionais que neles participaram, e de que Portugal é parte – de 
Direito Internacional e de Direito da União Europeia, os quais são reconhecidos pela Constituição, desde logo no artigo 
8.º, n.º 2. (§2).’ 
76 See F. Pereira Coutinho, ‘A natureza jurídica dos memorandos da “Troika”’. Themis, no. 24/25, 2013, p. 147-179. 
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of the Financial and Assistance Programme (judgments nos. 187/2013, 413/2014, 574 and 575/2014). 
To this end, in Acórdão no. 353/2012, while the Court declared the suspension of the allowances 
unconstitutional, it did not go so far as to irremediably impair the government’s duties and 
commitments vis-à-vis the other Eurozone countries and the Troika. When the decision was taken, the 
execution of the budget for 2012 was already underway. Thus, the Court considered that the 
consequence of a declaration of unconstitutionality, namely the annulment of the law ex tunc, could 
have put the state’s solvency in danger, as the State would have to give the suspended allowances back 
to their legitimate holders. Therefore, the Constitutional Court used the prerogative it has under Article 
282.4 Pt. Const. and restricted the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality and decided not to 
apply them to the suspension of the 13th and 14th monthly allowances in 2012. The Court thus sent a 
clear message to the parliament and government and for the next Budget Act recommended them to 
take the fundamental principles of the Constitution – like the principle of proportional equality – into 
consideration and balance them with the obligations arising from the Financial and Assistance 
Programme. This was to say that, should the legislator disregard this warning in the future, then the 
Constitutional Court would declare those provisions invalid and therefore annul them ex tunc. 
Indeed, the next step in the development of the Court’s case law was precisely to apply what it had 
threatened to do in Acórdão no. 353/2012. The application of its precedents and of the test developed 
in 2011 was, however, highly controversial as it was confirmed by a slight majority of the judges – 7 
to 6 – which decided on each question.77 The Budget Act for 2013, Law no. 66-B/2012, was partially 
struck down on 5 April 2013 by Acórdão no. 187/2013, which jointly decided four constitutional 
actions brought before the Court by a variety of actors: the President of the Republic, parliamentary 
minorities and the ombudsman (nos. 2, 5, 8, 11/2013). The Court recognized that the following 
provisions were in breach of the Constitution: suspension of the holiday allowance for public workers 
(Article 29), for teachers and researchers (Article 31), and of the holiday allowance for pensioners 
(Article 77); and the duty imposed upon the beneficiaries of unemployment subsidies to pay social 
security contributions of 6 instead of 5 per cent. The first three articles of the Budget Act for 2013 
were found in breach of the principle of equality (Article 13), since the Act again targeted the same 
categories of people as the previous Budget Acts and thus de facto extended the wage and the pension 
cut for a further year. The forced payment of a contribution from unemployment subsidies, instead, 
was considered to violate the principle of proportionality: the same objectives could be achieved by 
less restrictive means and without damaging an already disadvantaged group of people. The Court 
referred extensively to the situation of economic emergency and to the Financial Assistance 
Programme and restated once more the need to accommodate its implementation with constitutional 
obligations.  
The Court refrained from declaring other challenged provisions of the Budget unconstitutional,78 but 
this judgment nonetheless resulted in a shock at the institutional level. Indeed, the Government had 
tried to adapt the Budget Act for 2013 to the conditions posed by the Court in 2012 by increasing the 
level of taxation for everyone and by containing the salary cuts for public workers. The composition of 
the coalition government itself was affected. In April 2013, the Minister for parliamentary affairs, 
Miguel Relvas, resigned and new Ministers were appointed. In July 2013, following the resignation of 
the Minister of Finance, Vitor Gaspar, Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho tried to end a week-long 
political crisis through a Government reshuffle. This political crisis was one of the many consequences 
of Acórdão no. 187/2013 which forced Portugal to re-negotiate the terms of the Financial and 
Assistance Programme. Indeed, the Portuguese Constitutional Court was perceived by the EU 
                                                     
77 See G. Coelho, P. Caro de Sousa, ‘«La morte dei mille tagli». Nota sulla decisione della Corte costituzionale portoghese in 
merito alla legittimità del bilancio annuale 2013’, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 3/2013, p. 527-
544, and M. Nogueira de Brito, ‘Medida e Intensidade do Controlo de Igualdade na Jurisprudência da Crise do Tribunal 
Constituciona’, in O Tribunal Constitucional e a Crise, Almedina, 2014, p. 107 ff. 
78 The Court was also asked to review the constitutionality of other provisions of the Budget Act for 2013, such as art. 27, 
which confirmed the wage cut for public workers for the third year, and art. 45, about overtime payment, which were not 
eventually declared unconstitutional. 
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institutions and by the Troika as a threat to Portugal’s financial stability and on the occasion of the 
seventh update of the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality of 
May 2013 one of the conditions laid down for the Government to receive financial assistance was to 
‘take a number of steps aiming at mitigating the legal risks from future potential Constitutional Court 
rulings’.79 This proves quite clearly how problematic judgment no. 187/2013 was for the legitimacy of 
the Portuguese Constitutional Court, for its relationship with the Government and for the fulfilment of 
European and international obligations.80 
However, in spite of the severe implications of the judgment, the Court did not depart from its 
consolidated line of reasoning. As stated above, judgment no. 187/2013 was also solved by applying 
fundamental principles of the Portuguese democratic State – namely the principles of equality and 
proportionality – as standards for review, in spite of the fact that the applicants had claimed a violation 
of specific social rights. For example, Article 77 of the Budget Act for 2013, on cutting the holiday 
allowance to pensioners, was claimed to encroach upon Article 63 Pt. Const. and the right to social 
security. The Court simply disregarded this claim and continued to do so in all its other judgments on 
Euro-crisis law, with one exception: judgment no. 602/2013.  
In decision no 474/2013, of 29 August 2013, a decree of the Portuguese Parliament, which made the 
dismissal of public employees for objective reasons easier and which operated ope legis, was declared 
unconstitutional as it violated the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the 
principle of legal certainty, both derived from Article 2 Pt. Const. The Court stated that the national 
measures – the Budget Acts – implementing the Financial and Economic Assistance Programme had 
justified the salary cuts of public workers in exchange for the greater job stability that they enjoyed 
compared to workers in the private sector. Such a justification created an expectation among public 
employees that, according to the Court, had to be protected and that the decree contradicted. The 
relevant provision of the decree, however, did not survive the Court’s usual test for temporary effects 
and proportionality of the measures. According to the Court, the contested provision was certainly not 
transitional and the legislator failed to demonstrate that the changes in labour relationships in the 
public sector were really necessary and adequate to match the need for a more efficient public 
administration.81 
Likewise, in Acórdão no 862/2013 of 19 December 2013, in the framework on an ex ante 
constitutional review, several legislative provisions aiming to amend the statute governing the 
retirement of public sector staff were declared unconstitutional on the ground of a violation of the 
protection of legitimate expectations. These provisions (retrospectively) cut the pensions paid by the 
public pension fund (CGA) by 10 per cent and introduced a less favourable formula for calculating 
pensions. As in its previous judgments on public salary cuts (decisions nos. 353/2012 and 187/2013), 
the Constitutional Court highlighted that only some of the pensioners, namely public servant 
pensioners, were subject to cuts. According to the Court, in this case too the measure had an indefinite 
duration and it could only be justified if and insofar as it was part of an overall structural reform of the 
public system in which several factors affecting financial sustainability were addressed at the same 
                                                     
79 See European Commission, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal - Seventh Review, Annex 5, § 1.28, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp153_en.pdf and M. 
Nogueira, De Brito, ‘Putting social rights in brackets? The Portuguese experience with welfare challenges in times of 
crisis’, in C. Kilpatrick and B. De Witte, cit., p. 70. 
80 On the effect of Acórdão no. 187/2013 on the compliance with EU and international obligations taken by Portugal, see M. 
Nogueira De Brito, Comentário ao Acórdão nº 353/2012 do Tribunal Constitucional, in Direito & política 2012, p. 108 
ff.; A. Dos Santos, C. Celorico Palma, O Acordão do Tribunal Constitucional nº 353/2012 de 5 de julho: a prevalência 
da razão juridica sobre a razão económica, in Revista  e finanças públicas e direito fiscal 2012, p. 31 ff.; R. Cisotta & D. 
Gallo, Il Tribunale costituzionale portoghese, i risvolti sociali delle misure di austerità ed il rispetto dei vincoli 
internazionali ed europei, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, vol. 7, 2013, n. 2, p. 465-480. 
81 This ruling was criticised as proving the judicial activism of the Court, in particular for the argument that the parliament 
failed to demonstrate the need for and the suitability of the reform of the rules on the dismissal of public workers: see G. 
Almeida Ribeiro, ‘O Constitucionalismo dos Princípios’, O Tribunal Constitucional e a Crise, Almedina, 2014, p. 71 ff. 
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time to improve intra- and inter-generational fairness. The Court only elaborated on the nature of the 
right to a pension as a social right in an obiter dicta. The Court conceived this right to be derived from 
the right to social security and a ‘positive constitutional-law social right’, which imposes a positive 
obligation upon the state.82 In spite of this definition, the Court did not use the right to a pension as a 
standard of review. 
So far, the only ruling of the Portuguese Constitutional Court on Euro-crisis law in which social rights 
rather than fundamental principles of the Constitution have grounded the judgment was Acórdão no 
602/2013 of 20 September 2013, in the matter of Labour Law. The Court struck down certain 
provisions of Law no. 23/2012 which amended the Labour Code of 2009. These provisions violated 
the constitutional prohibition of dismissal without just cause (Article 53 Pt. Const.) and certain 
provisions of collective labour regulation instruments (IRCTs), for example regarding rest periods 
granted as compensation for working overtime on normal working days, during compensatory weekly 
rest days or public holidays. The violation of the IRCTs by Law no. 23/2012 amounted to an 
infringement of Article 56, sections 3 and 4 Pt. Const., on the right of trade unions and of individuals 
to enter collective agreements, in combination with Article 18.2 Pt. Const, according to which 
restrictions of rights must be provided for by the Constitution and only for the protection of other 
rights and interests safeguarded by the Constitution itself.  
This case, however, appears isolated in the rich case law of the Portuguese Constitutional Court on 
Euro-crisis law, since subsequent judgments were all decided, again, on the basis of fundamental 
principles, like the principle of equality (judgments nos. 413 and 574/2014), the principle of 
proportionality (judgment no. 413/2014), and the principle of legitimate expectations (judgment no. 
575/2014). These cases, which saw the Court internally divided and which were solved by slight 
majorities, again dealt with salary and pension cuts for public workers and pensioners. The Court 
confirmed the application of its test developed in 2011 about the temporary nature of the cuts and their 
suitability to pursue the targeted objectives of fiscal stability and reduction of the public deficit. In 
particular, any cut in public wages that was planned to apply from 2015 onwards was held to be 
unconstitutional (judgments nos. 574 and 575/2014). 
In Acórdão no. 413/2014 of 30 May 2014, Article 115 of the Budget Act for 2014 was declared 
unconstitutional as it required an additional sacrifice of unemployed people by again asking them – as 
in case no. 187/2013 – to pay a contribution from their unemployment subsidies. The measure was 
considered disproportionate as it affected a group who were already in a situation of particular 
vulnerability without achieving a substantive benefit in terms of public revenues. Furthermore, the 
Court declared the reduction of survivors’ pensions (Article 117 of the Budget Act) and public wage 
cuts (Article 33) to be in violation of the principle of equality. In particular, Article 33 increased the 
number of public workers who were subject to this increase in their salary cut – from 3.5 to 10 % of 
their wage – from those who earned more than 1500 euro (as had been upheld in case no. 353/2012) to 
those who only had an income above 675 euro. This minimum threshold was deemed too low. Given 
the financial impact of the judgment, however, the Court decided to exercise its power under Article 
282.4 Pt. Const. and to declare the effects of the unconstitutionality of Article 33 to be ex nunc rather 
than ex tunc.   
Perhaps a deviation from this case law is represented by Acórdão no. 794/2013 of 21 November 2013 
and no. 572/2014 of 30 July 2014, both again showing a highly divided Court. In the first ruling, the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of norms that increased the normal working hours for public 
workers. These norms aimed to extend the application of the general labour rules to public employees. 
Such a convergence between the two regimes, according to the Constitutional Court, was foreseeable 
by workers, given the national economic situation, and thus it did not impair the protection of their 
legitimate expectations. Moreover, the right to remuneration was not violated insofar as the reduction 
in the payment for ordinary working activity could be compensated by payment for overtime work. 
Judgment no. 572/2014 confirmed the validity of the provisions of the supplementary budget act for 
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2014, which on the one hand increased the amount of the extraordinary solidarity contribution (CES) 
from the highest pensions while at the same time increasing the number of pensioners subject to this 
contribution, and on the other increased the contribution for public health insurance. The 
constitutionality of CES, which was introduced in 2011 and already judged in compliance with the 
Constitution in Acórdão no. 187/2013, was confirmed on the basis of the temporary and exceptional 
nature of the contribution, which, however, had been raised year after year in the annual Budget Acts. 
The contribution for public health insurance derived from the free choice of public workers to be 
registered in that insurance regime. As was expressly admitted, in this ruling the Court tried to limit 
the backlash of its previous judgment on the Budget Act for 2014, in particular Acórdão no. 862/2013, 
which considered additional pension cuts unconstitutional. In turn, the Portuguese Government was 
forced to submit a supplementary budget act for 2014 in order to retrieve resources to fund the system 
of social security while at the same time in a crucial moment for the country complying with the fiscal 
objectives for 2014. Portugal was indeed still benefitting from financial assistance, but was about to 
exit the financial and assistance programme. In addition, annulling the norms in the supplementary 
budget act on CES and on funding public health insurance would have ultimately impaired the 
legitimacy of the Court, making it responsible for a weakening of Portugal’s financial credibility. 
Portuguese constitutional case law on Euro-crisis measures has deeply affected the relationship 
between the Constitutional Court, on the one hand, and the Government and Parliament on the other. 
The contentious rulings in which the Court struck down parts of the annual Budget Acts split the Court 
and were the outcome of a very difficult compromise to reach, based on the enforcement of 
fundamental principles.83 Indeed, reaching agreement on the application of these principles has at least 
two advantages: first, managing principles allows the Court to adapt the balancing case by case; 
second, solving a case based on principles does not tie the hand of the legislator as much as using 
social rights, which would leave less discretion to Parliament in shaping future legislation. 
Nevertheless, the resort to principles by the Portuguese Constitutional Court has not prevented it from 
accusations of judicial activism and against its legitimacy at the national and international levels.84 The 
need for legal certainty and the threat of future declarations of unconstitutionality by the Constitutional 
Court have pushed the Portuguese Government to exploit the tool of ex ante  review of draft Budget 
Acts – which has been used on very few occasions – so as to clarify in advance if there is a breach of 
the Constitution. 
III.B Regional autonomy revisited 
Italy, Portugal and Spain have either their whole territory or part thereof divided into regions provided 
with legislative autonomy, according to the constitutional allocation of legislative competences. In 
particular, Italy is organized into 20 regions and two autonomous provinces, Spain into 17 autonomous 
communities, and Portugal acknowledges legislative powers only to two autonomous regions, the 
Azores and Madeira, because of the ultraperipheral nature of these archipelagos, whereas the 
remaining part of the territory is only administered by the central government. 
As usually happens in periods of crisis, State institutions have become more active in the protection of 
the unity of the nation and of equivalent living conditions throughout the entire territory. This process 
often goes in parallel with a limitation of the existing legislative powers and autonomy of regions for 
the sake of restoring financial stability and aiding recovery.85 In order to react against economic and 
financial troubles, the state level of government is keen to re-centralise some policies or to lead 
coordinated action to restore certain common standards of living in all regions. In addition, especially 
when autonomous regions administer most of the social services, as in Spain, or a significant quota, as 
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84 See P. Wise, S. Gordon, ‘Portuguese government grapples with its constitutional court’, Financial Times, 15 June 2014, 
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in Italy and Portugal, and thus manage a substantial proportion of public spending, State institutions 
have an interest in further limiting regional autonomy in the present context of the Euro-crisis. Indeed, 
the State as a whole is responsible before EU institutions for compliance with Euro-crisis law. 
Therefore, particularly in this context, the burden of solving disputes between regions and the State is 
often left to the Constitutional Courts. Regions claim respect for their legislative prerogatives under 
the Constitution; the State advocates interventions at the central level of government to protect the 
common objective of sound public accounts for the entire territory.  
This trend is confirmed in the constitutional case law in Italy, Portugal, and Spain during the Eurozone 
crisis. However, except for Portugal, where before the crisis the autonomy of Azores and Madeira had 
been very much enhanced, including through constitutional amendments, the limitation of regional 
autonomy in Italy and Spain is anything but new. From this standpoint, the application of Euro-crisis 
law in Italy and Spain has not overturned past constitutional case law; instead, Euro-crisis law has 
strengthened a trend that was already in place: the two Constitutional Courts have provided an 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions dealing with the division of legislative competence 
between the State and regions in favour of the former and expanding the power of the national 
Parliament for years.  
Italy 
In Italy, the legislative competence of the regions was extended by the constitutional reform of 2001 
(Const. Law no 3/2001), which inverted the criteria for the allocation of legislative powers between 
regions and State. The catalogue of concurring competences was expanded,86 the residual clause, once 
in favour of the State, now runs to the benefit of the regions, and the limit of the ‘national interest’ for 
regional legislation, which allowed the State legislative intervention over regional competences, was 
formally repealed.  
The amended constitutional provisions soon became a source of constitutional conflicts between the 
State and the regions, which in turn gave rise to a significant growth in controversies before the 
Constitutional Court. In 2004, for the first time ever since the setting up of the Italian Constitutional 
Court, the number of judgments issued following a principaliter proceeding – which is used by the 
State or regions to challenge the validity of regional or State legislation – exceeded those rendered on 
the basis of an incidentaliter proceeding, i.e. on a preliminary question of constitutionality requested 
by ordinary judges.87 Since 2004, the trend of an increasing number of principaliter proceedings has 
been confirmed, and in 2012 and 2013, in conjunction with the adoption of austerity measures by the 
State, the greatest part of the Court’s activity was absorbed by constitutional conflicts over the 
legislative competence of the State and regions. 
In the case law of the Italian Constitutional Court, however, a restrictive interpretation of the new and 
broader catalogue of regional competences has largely prevailed since the entry into force of the 
constitutional amendments. Many scholars have even argued that the Constitutional Court has ‘re-
written’ Title V of the Constitution, on Regions, Provinces and Municipalities, in favour of the State.88 
For example, the Court has used the principle of subsidiarity – which in Italy refers to administrative 
functions – to expand State legislative powers, provided that some procedural requirements are 
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complied with,89 or has detected some subject matters – e.g. the protection of the environment and of 
competition and the determination of the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements 
– as ‘horizontal clauses’ that allow the State to pass laws even when regional competences are 
crossed.90  
This trend towards the limitation of regional competence through constitutional case law has been 
strengthened by the Italian Constitutional Court in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. A number of 
regional laws have been declared unconstitutional on the ground of the need to protect the economic 
and legal unity of the Italian Republic (from judgments nos. 274/2003 and 43/2004 to judgment no. 
78/2014) and because of a lack of compliance with fundamental State principles in the matter of 
coordination of public finance, the main tool used as a ‘horizontal clause’ to re-centralise legislative 
powers to the national Parliament. Likewise State interventions grounded on this clause have usually 
been upheld (judgments nos. 267/2006, 179/2007, 37/2011, 198/2012 and 60/2013). 
Several rulings of the Italian Constitutional Court have affected the concurring legislative competence 
between the State and regions in matters of public health care91 regarding exemption from payment for 
health care services (decision no. 325/2011), about the rules and limits for hiring medical personnel 
and the management of hospitals and public health care offices (decisions nos. 150/2010, 333/2010 
and 68/2011), and regional health care expenditure (decision no. 79/2013). In a series of judgments 
from 2010 to 2014, not only did the Italian Constitutional Court rule that these issues fell within the 
remit of another concurring legislative competence, ‘coordination of public finance’, rather than in 
that of the protection of health care, but regional legislation was also systematically found to be in 
violation of the fundamental principles provided by State legislation on the coordination of public 
finance, and thus the relevant regional provisions were declared unconstitutional (decisions nos. 
33/2012, 91/2012, 129/2012, 131/2012, 79/2013, 104/2013 and 180/2013). This case law of the Italian 
Constitutional Court also depended on the pressure exerted on public finance by the huge deficits of 
most of the 20 regional health care systems, which were in existence well before the Eurozone crisis. 
However, with the reform of economic governance in the EU these regional deficits could now 
endanger the achievement of the national medium-term objective. According to the Italian 
Constitutional Court, whenever the adjustment programmes regarding regional health care systems in 
deficit and agreed with the State were violated by regional legislation, regional laws must be declared 
in breach of Article 117.3 It. Const. Indeed, these adjustment programmes are deemed to set out the 
fundamental principles for the coordination of public finance to be complied with by regional 
legislation.  
The Italian Constitutional Court has stated that the need for the coordination of public finance and for 
enhancing financial stability can justify a limitation of the shared regional legislative competence in 
matters of health care protection (decisions nos. 91/2012 and 51/2013) or even of the residual 
legislative competence of regions in the field of regional organization, i.e. the organization of public 
offices (decision no. 236/2013). The Court is perfectly aware of the centralizing effect on public 
policies of its case law grounded on the need for better coordination of public finance. In the Annual 
Report on constitutional case law in 2013, the then President of the Italian Constitutional Court, 
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Justice Gaetano Silvestri, pointed to this outcome as a major concern: there has been a multiplication 
of judgments that justify the interference of the State in regional legislation (p.3)92.  
A line of reasoning of the Italian Constitutional Court that is complementary to the first one about the 
limitation of regional legislative competence in the name of the uniformity and coordination of public 
finance and centralized control of expenditure is based on a de facto enlargement of the legislative 
competence of the State, in line with pre-crisis constitutional case law. In particular, the State 
legislative competence in the matter of the ‘determination of the basic level of benefits relating to civil 
and social entitlements to be guaranteed throughout the national territory’, which is an exclusive 
legislative competence of the State (Article 117.2, lit. m, It. Const.), and the minimum levels of health 
care assistance, has been expanded by the case law of the Court to the detriment of regional legislative 
competences. 
A remarkable example in which the justification of the crisis also vigorously appeared is decision no. 
10/2010 on the so-called ‘social card’. The ‘social card’ was a bonus provided by Decree-law no. 
112/2008 from which the most disadvantaged segments of the Italian population benefited so as to 
satisfy their primary dietary needs, and to support them in paying for health care services and 
accommodation costs. Three Regions challenged the constitutional validity of the decree-law on 
several grounds, all related to the invasion of regional legislative competences. In upholding the 
constitutionality of the decree-law, the Court stated that State action was necessary to protect human 
dignity in a uniform, appropriate and timely manner, in particular that of the most vulnerable part of 
the population. The duty of the Italian Republic to maintain economic and social solidarity (Article 2 
Const.), the principle of substantive equality (Article 3 Const.), the right to welfare support (Article 38 
Const.), and to determine the basic level of benefits throughout the national territory (Article 117.2, lit. 
m Const.) allowed the State to overstep the residual legislative competence of the Regions in matters 
of social services and welfare. Furthermore, the decree-law at stake was deemed in compliance with 
the Constitution in the light of ‘the extraordinary, exceptional and urgent situation following the 
international economic and financial crisis that also hit our country in 2008 and 2009’ (own 
translation). Thus, according to the Court, in a time of scarce resources even social rights should 
preferably be protected at State level so as to set common standards and to decide at the centre how to 
use resources. 
On a few occasions, the Italian Constitutional Court has deviated from this case law by stating that 
restriction of the financial autonomy of the regions could not be justified simply by the economic 
emergency (decision no. 148/2012) and these limitations only remained legitimate as long as they 
were temporary (decision no. 193/2012). While the attempt to enforce fiscal federalism in Italy (Law 
no. 42/2009) had the ‘original intent’ of enhancing the autonomy of regions to impose and collect 
taxes and to decide on their own expenditures, it has turned out primarily to limit this autonomy by 
capping the out-of-control spending and deficits of many regions. This limitation is pursued with the 
aim of making regions responsible for the management of their own budgets without them becoming 
an unbearable burden for Italian financial stability. The responsibilization of regional governments can 
even be fulfilled through the dismissal of a regional President by the President of the Republic in the 
event of serious financial distress of a region (Article 2, Legislative Decree no. 149/2011).93 This 
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sanction, which was linked to a persistent deficit of a regional health care system as a source of 
political failure of the President of a Region, was declared unconstitutional by the Italian 
Constitutional Court, not because dismissal for the purpose of sustaining regional accounts was 
illegitimate in itself, but because of the procedure fixed by Legislative Decree no. 149/2011 (judgment 
no 219/2013). The procedure foresaw the imposition of the sanction as automatic following the 
verification of the serious financial distress by the Court of auditors, without leaving discretion to the 
national Government about the exceptional circumstances that could justify the dismissal.94 However, 
the Constitutional Court has not excluded that the threat of dismissal could be used to foster the fiscal 
responsibilization of the regions from above. It is this paternalistic view of the relationship between 
State and regions for the sake of financial stability that has led the dismissal of the President of a 
region to be described as the ‘new frontier of the coordination of public finance’ by the central 
government.95 
While waiting for the enforcement of the balanced budget clause, in operation since January 2014, the 
need to contain public expenditure has led the Constitutional Court to provide a more rigorous 
interpretation of the regional legislation of Article 81, in the version in force prior to Const. Law no. 
1/2012. According to the then Article 81.4 Const., ‘any other law involving new or increased spending 
shall detail the means therefore’ and in decision no. 70/2012 the Italian Constitutional Court 
interpreted this provision as binding upon the Regions, too. Indeed, the Court declared the Budget Act 
of Campania (an Italian Region) for 2011 unconstitutional because the fiscal coverage it provided did 
not meet the standards set by Article 81.4 Const. as interpreted by the Court in its previous judgments 
concerning state legislation (decision no. 1/1966). In particular, fiscal coverage ‘must be credible, safe 
enough and not arbitrary or irrational’ (own translation). The lack of clarity, of data, and of entries in 
the regional budget might jeopardize the financial balance in 2011 and in the following years. The 
Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the huge effects that a declaration of unconstitutionality 
of a Budget Act can produce. Subsequently, many other regional laws have been declared 
unconstitutional for violation of Article 81.4 It. Const. (e.g. judgments nos. 68/2014, 190/2014 and 
224/2014). 
The Italian Constitutional Court acknowledged the new constraints deriving from the balanced budget 
clause both before and after its official enforcement (judgments nos. 60/2013, 4/2014 and 68/2014). 
However, by contrast with the Spanish Constitutional Court, since 1 January the balanced budget 
clause has not been treated as ius superveniens by the Italian Court and thus cases brought before 
January 2014 but decided afterwards have been solved on the ground of the old standard of review 
(Article 81.4). On one occasion – decision no. 68/2014 – the new constitutional standard, i.e. the 
balanced budget clause of Article 81.1 It. Const., was invoked by the State against a regional law that 
provided for a local art event to be funded by the Region without specific allocation of resources for 
this purpose. Part of the regional funds had to be transferred before January 2014, and thus the old 
version of Article 81 It. Const. was cited; however, the remaining part of the funds would have been 
granted in 2014 and this is why the new balanced budget clause was also mentioned as a standard of 
review. Nevertheless, the Italian Constitutional Court decided to solve the case on the ground of the 
lack of fiscal coverage of the regional law, and declared it in breach of Art. 81.4 It. Const. (old 
version). In the next few months, however, the Constitutional Court will decide on constitutional 
challenges brought in 2014 on the ground of the new constitutional provisions on a balanced budget 
                                                     
94 Legislative Decree no 149/2011 was also found unconstitutional on other grounds, including the position of the President 
of the Region as the commissioner ad acta of the Region, which is also a serious problem in terms of de-
responsabilization (see C. Pinelli, ‘In tema di scioglimento e rimozione degli organi regionali’, Giurisprudenza 
costituzionale, no. 3, 2014, p. 3145 ff.). However, given the weak connection of these elements with the adjudication of 
Euro-crisis law, they are not analysed here. 
95 See L. Gori, ‘La minaccia di rimozione del Presidente della Regione come nuova frontiera del coordinamento della finanza 
pubblica? Il decreto legislativo «premi e sanzioni»’, Giurisprudenza costituzionale, no. 4, 2013, p. 3150 ff. 
Constitutional Courts Facing the Euro Crisis 
35 
for the State (Article 81.1 It. Const.), for the overall system of public administration (Art. 97 It. 
Const.) and for regional and local authorities (Article 119.1 It. Const.).96 
Even before the balanced budget clause has been fully enforced by the Court,97 constitutional rulings 
on Euro-crisis law affecting regional competences can so far be seen to be in continuity with past 
decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court that have usually run in favour of the expansion of the 
State legislative domain. This reading of constitutional case law during the Eurozone crisis is further 
confirmed by judgment no. 88/2014. This case law is important for several reasons. It was the first 
case dealing with the new provisions introduced after the constitutional reform of 2012 on a balanced 
budget that was brought before the Italian Constitutional Court by regions provided with a broader 
level of autonomy than ordinary regions – a special region, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, and an autonomous 
Province, Trento. Second, the object of constitutional review was State Law no. 243/2012, the 
‘reinforced’ law applying many provisions of Const. Law no. 1/2012 that was adopted and can be 
amended only by an absolute majority in Parliament and that in prospect can be used by the Court as a 
standard for constitutional review besides the constitutional balanced budget clause.98  
The applicants contested the violation of regional autonomy by the very detailed provisions of State 
Law no. 243/2012 on regional and local authorities resorting to borrowing and on the constraints for 
regions in using deficit spending. The Italian Constitutional Court, however, dismissed most of the 
regional challenges. It only considered unconstitutional the conferral to the Government of a general 
power to regulate borrowing by regional and local authorities, which the Court narrowed to regulation 
of the ‘technical’ aspects, thus preserving the political discretion of the national parliament and of the 
regional political bodies. Moreover, the Italian Constitutional Court found unconstitutional the lack of 
involvement of the inter-governmental Conference between the State, regions and local authorities to 
determine their contributions to the amortization of public debt. Although this ruling will allow 
regions to participate in the procedure, the Court clarified that should an agreement within the inter-
governmental Conference be impossible to reach the State can decide anyway without the consent of 
the Regions. This ruling can be read as ultimately strengthening the legitimacy of State Law no. 
243/2012 vis-à-vis regional claims. 
Spain 
Since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, the legislative powers of the Autonomous Communities 
have also been severely constrained in Spain. The constitutional reform of 2011 and its subsequent 
legislative enforcement have definitely seconded this trend, also affecting the constitutional review of 
legislation. Organic Law no 2/2012, on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability, substantially 
replicated the EU Stability and Growth Pact at national level between the centre and the periphery. For 
example, a potential violation of the balanced budget clause on the part of the Autonomous 
Communities can be easily challenged by the State before the Constitutional Court, but no symmetric 
appeal is provided for the Autonomous Communities against the State.99 
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This Organic Law no. 2/2012 has indeed been challenged before the Constitutional Court on several 
grounds by the Government of the Autonomous Community of Canary Islands (Recurso de 
inconstitucionalidad no 557/2013). For example, the Government of Canary Islands contested the 
power of the national Government, conferred by Article 16 of Organic law no. 2/2012, to fix for each 
Autonomous Community the objective of budgetary stability and the level of public debt and thus to 
annul the fiscal autonomy of the Communities. The appeal was declared admissible by the 
Constitutional Court, but it is currently pending judgment on the merits of the complaint. 
The limitation of the budgetary autonomy of the Spanish regions, however, dates back at least ten 
years before the constitutional reform of the balanced budget clause and the Euro crisis. In other words 
the trend towards re-centralization of the Spanish quasi-federal State preceded the current financial 
troubles, and the crisis, as in Italy, has just strengthened a process that was already in place.100 
Limitation of regional budgetary powers was achieved first of all by means of ordinary and organic 
State legislation, the constitutionality of which was systematically confirmed by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, while at the same time the Court did not hesitate to strike down budget acts of 
the Autonomous Communities.101 The entry into force of the first Law on Budgetary Stability, no. 
18/2001, and its subsequent amendments, triggered a series of actions for unconstitutionality on the 
part of the Parliaments and Governments of the Autonomous Communities. The new Law on 
Budgetary Stability, indeed, also fixed guiding principles for regions and local authorities – like the 
principle of budgetary stability – that could constrain their budgetary autonomy and that were accused 
of encroaching upon regional competences.102 
Based on an action brought by the Parliament of Catalonia against the Law on Budgetary Stability, in 
decision no. 134/2011 the Spanish Constitutional Court decided its leading case for constitutional case 
law on the Euro-crisis measures. As highlighted, the judgment was issued before the constitutional 
amendment bill was examined in Parliament, but in spite of this fact the Constitutional Court 
considered the principle of the balanced budget to deserve constitutional protection. The Parliament of 
the Autonomous Community of Catalonia had filed an action challenging the violation of the 
constitutional principle of financial autonomy of the Community by Law no. 18/2001 and Organic 
Law no. 5/2001, as amended in 2007 and 2006, since they imposed the principle of a balanced budget. 
Although the Parliament of Catalonia acknowledged the exclusive legislative competence of the State 
on the basic rules and coordination of general economic planning (Article 149.1.13 Const.),103 it 
contested that by means of the organic and ordinary laws the State Parliament acted ultra vires and 
imposed too tight a fiscal discipline compared to the obligations deriving from EU law, in particular 
the then version of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Constitutional Court disregarded the reference 
made by the Catalan Parliament to EU law. Relying on previous constitutional case law (since 
decision no. 28/1991), the Court excluded that EU legal norms could form part of the standard for the 
constitutional review of legislation. The Court dismissed the appeal: relying on past constitutional case 
law (decision no. 62/2001), the State had the power to introduce fiscal constraints upon public 
accounts and to impose compliance with the balanced budget rule on all administrations, including 
those of the Autonomous Communities. Therefore, even before the constitutional reform the Court de 
facto ‘upgraded’ the status of the balanced budget rule from ordinary to constitutional nature.  
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Decision no. 134/2011 is the precedent on which 13 other judgments afterwards relied (see, for 
example, decisions nos. 157/2011, 185/2011, 189/2011, 195/2011, 199/2011 and 203/2011) based on 
actions of unconstitutionality brought by several Governments of Autonomous Communities and by 
the then socialist parliamentary opposition against Law no. 18/2001 on Budgetary Stability and 
Organic Law no. 5/2011, as modified. However, by the time of these new judgments Article 135 Sp. 
Const. had been amended and therefore the standard of review had changed as the Court clearly 
highlighted. Also based on the new constitutional standard, the Court confirmed its reading of the 
constitutional text that enables the State Government to guarantee the enforcement of the balanced 
budget rule for all levels of government. 
The trend towards re-centralization is also confirmed by the enactment of State Law no. 27/2013 on 
the rationalisation and sustainability of Local Administrations. The validity of this Law was 
challenged before the Constitutional Court by a variety of institutional actors: by the Governments and 
the Parliaments of many Autonomous Communities, in practice all the Autonomous Communities not 
ruled by the Partido Popular, which has the majority at the national level and in 10 of the 17 
Regions;104 by the socialist parliamentary opposition in the State Parliament; and by nearly 3000 
municipalities.105 Besides the alleged violation of the regional legislative competences on local 
matters, it is also contended in these actions that Law no. 27/2013 impairs the competences of local 
Autonomous Communities themselves, in particular their right to self-government (Article 137 Sp. 
Const.) and their political and fiscal autonomy (Articles 140 and 142 Sp. Const.). The actions were 
declared admissible by the Constitutional Court, but given the timing of the Court’s judgments, the 
cases will be decided on their merits in the coming years, which in turn implies that the effects of Law 
no 27/2013 on the regions and local government will endure.   
The legislative powers of the Autonomous Communities, which, based on the Constitution and on 
their Statutes of autonomy, are competent to regulate most social policies (education, health care, 
social assistance), had also been already squeezed before the Eurozone crisis.106 The ‘expansion’ of 
State legislation on social matters, which has been seconded by constitutional case law, has mainly 
derived from the extensive interpretation that the State legislator and the Constitutional Court have 
provided of the State legal bases for the different subject matters. According to the Court, these legal 
bases, established by the State and which have to be respected by Autonomous Communities when 
passing legislation in the relevant field, can also be fixed by regulations and often they have been 
considered in compliance with the Constitution despite going well beyond the definition of mere 
principles.107 Even in matters of social assistance, where, based on the constitutional catalogue of 
subject matters, the State lacks legislative competence, since the early 1990s the Constitutional Court 
has acknowledged the authority of the State to grant social allowances (decision no. 13/1992) 
regardless of the regional competence in this field whenever such allowances ensure the fundamental 
conditions of equality ‘of all Spaniards in the exercise of their rights and in the fulfilment of their 
constitutional duties (Article 149.1.1 Sp. Const.)’. This general and horizontal equality clause was 
regularly used by the Constitutional Court in the years of economic expansion to justify State 
intervention to the detriment of the autonomy of regional social policies (decision no. 61/1997).108 
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The trend is again confirmed in the most recent case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. For example, the Constitutional Court has taken a stance in favour of 
the State Government against the attempt by Autonomous Communities to increase the price of 
medicines on their own. Measures taken by the Catalan Parliament and by the Parliament of Madrid 
imposed on citizens the payment of a fixed price – a tax of one euro – on medical prescriptions, the so-
called ‘euro por receta’, which the central Government deemed in breach of the State competence to 
define the legislative bases in matters of health care (Article 149.1.16 Sp. Const.). Before the cases 
were decided on their merits, the Constitutional Court confirmed the suspension of the challenged 
regional measures requested by the State (Auto 122/2013 and Auto 142/2013).109 According to the 
Court, whereas the reduction of pharmaceutical expenditure for public accounts was easily 
quantifiable as a consequence of the regional legislation and was justified under the present economic 
conditions, the benefit of the measures to the overall population was far more uncertain and 
hypothetical, in particular in terms of consequences for the right to health care and because of 
inequalities arising among citizens living in different regions (Article 43 Sp. Const.).110 The 
suspension of the regional measures was maintained since a declaration of unconstitutionality would 
have made it extremely problematic for Catalonia and Madrid to reimburse citizens, and also for their 
fiscal stability. 
Indeed, the judgments on the merits in both cases (decisions nos. 71/2014 and 85/2014) found the 
formula of the ‘euro por receta’ based on co-funding of medicines between the national health care 
system and citizens unconstitutional. According to the Spanish Constitutional Court, the regional 
measures amounted to a violation of the State legislative competence. The fiscal autonomy of the 
Spanish regions (Article 15.1 Ley Orgánica 8/1980 de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas) 
is limited by the State’s basic competence to uniformly define how the health care system is funded on 
the national territory (Article 149.1.16 Sp. Const.). Both cases were solved by the Court solely on the 
ground of a conflict between State and regional legislative competences, without taking into account 
the implications for the rights of citizens nor the new fiscal and austerity rules, including new Article 
135 Sp. Const., which in principle could support a limitation of public expenditure in matters of health 
care. 
Portugal 
Compared to Italy and Spain, the protection of regional autonomy in Portugal during the Eurozone 
crisis did not occupy a central place in the constitutional debate. First of all, in Portugal the 
acknowledgment of legislative powers for the regions is far more recent than in the other two 
countries, being a consequence of the constitutional revisions in 1997 and in 2004.111 The original text 
(Contd.)                                                                   
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of the 1976 Constitution only provided for a very limited administrative autonomy for the regions. The 
second reason why concerns about regional legislative powers during the Euro crisis have been more 
circumscribed than those regarding, for instance, social rights lies in the fact that only the Azores and 
Madeira could be affected, since Portugal is a unitary state for the remaining part of its territory. The 
constitutional revisions of 1997 and 2004 certainly strengthened the political, administrative and 
legislative autonomy of the Azores and Madeira and some scholars even argued that the legislative 
unity of the Republic had been jeopardized.112 For example, Article 290 Pt. Const. prohibits 
constitutional amendments that could impair the political and administrative autonomy of the two 
archipelagos; and Article 228 Pt. Const. enables the Azores and Madeira to pass legislation – called 
regional legislative decrees – on any matters that are not under the exclusive responsibility of State 
sovereign bodies, provided that they are set out in the regional statutes. Moreover, even when the State 
has exclusive responsibility according to the Constitution, the two regional assemblies can adopt 
legislative decrees if so authorized by the national parliament (Assembleia da República).113 
In spite of the favour that the constitutional legislator has attached to regional autonomy, the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court has always been very cautious in this regard. Instead, the Court has 
usually provided a narrow reading of the legislative competences of the Azores and Madeira 
(decisions nos. 190/1987 and 151/1993)114 and some constitutional amendments regarding regions 
have been proposed to reverse constitutional case law and to expand regional autonomy against the 
interpretation of the Court.115  
This is further confirmed by the constitutional case law dealing with regional autonomy in the 
aftermath of the Eurozone crisis (Acórdãos nos. 613/2011, 568/2012, 767/2013, 55/2014, 252/2014 
and 467/2014). For example, in Acórdão 568/2012 the Portuguese Constitutional Court upheld the 
validity of Article 212 on the State Budget Act for 2012.116 Members of the socialist group in the 
legislative assembly of the Azores considered that the State Budget Act encroached upon the fiscal 
autonomy recognized to the region (Articles 227.1 j and 238 Pt. Const.) since it prescribed that 5% of 
the revenues collected in each region from income tax was to be devolved to local authorities. In 
accordance with its case law, the Constitutional Court considered that the State Budget Act only 
provided for a specification of the interpretation of the State Law on local assets and finance (Lei das 
Finanças Locais) and thus legitimately fell within the State competence. Nevertheless, the decision of 
the Court was not unanimous and, for example, Justice Maria de Fátima Mata-Mouros contended that 
a fair balance between the fiscal autonomy of regions and of local authorities could not be granted 
unilaterally by the State through an interpretive rule subverting the stable understanding and 
enforcement of the State Law on local assets and finance. 
Even more significant for the relationship between regional autonomy and Euro-crisis law is Acórdão 
55/2014, where the Representative of the Portuguese Republic in the Azores brought an action of 
unconstitutionality against a legislative decree of the regional assembly of the Azores which adopted 
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the regional budget act for 2014 in that it violated the State legislative competence aiming to protect 
the unity of the State and national solidarity (Articles 6 and 225 Pt. Const.) and the principle of 
equality (Articles 13 and 229.1 Pt. Const.).117 Indeed, the contested Azores regional budget act fixed a 
new regime of regional complementary income for civil servants in the region in spite of the fact that 
the State Budget Act for 2014 (Lei n.º 83-C/2013) not only provided for wage cuts but also forbade 
any income revaluation. According to the Representative of the Portuguese Republic, the effectiveness 
of these State austerity measures, which required sacrifices of all public workers, could have been 
impaired by the enforcement of the Budget Act for the Azores.  
The Constitutional Court did not find the regional legislative decree in breach of the principle of 
equality, partly in consideration of the need to correct inequalities ‘deriving from the autonomous 
regions’ insular nature’ (Article 229.1 Pt. Const.), but it considered it infringing the legislative 
competence of the State for the protection of the unity of the Republic and of national solidarity. Thus 
the legislative decree was declared unconstitutional on the ground of the boundaries between State and 
regional competences. Interestingly, the provisions of the State Budget Act for 2014 that the 
legislative decree violated were a few months later also found unconstitutional as they encroached 
upon the principles of equality and of proportionality (Acórdão 413/2014). 
III.C Constitutional reasoning  
Access to the Constitutional Court, the timing of the judgments, the particular economic situation as 
well as past judgments issued on the occasion of previous financial crises have shaped the reaction of 
the three Constitutional Courts to Euro-crisis law. The arguments used by constitutional judges to 
ground their decisions during this new crisis show several affinities with the past case law of the 
Courts, although there are some remarkable exceptions.  
For example, strategic and undisclosed reasons have certainly oriented the action of constitutional 
judges in the present context.118 Particularly in Italy and in Spain, where a balanced budget clause has 
been constitutionalized, although with delayed effects, the Constitutional Courts have tried to prepare 
the ground for the full enforcement of the clauses, usually by upholding the validity of austerity 
measures or by avoiding deciding on the merits. At the same time, given the financial troubles, these 
Courts have also tried to please their several stakeholders – political institutions, subnational entities, 
the EU, financial markets, etc. – whenever possible, to gradually prepare them for the change in the 
constitutional landscape, and to warn the legislator against potential unconstitutional developments, as 
the Portuguese Constitutional Court has done.  
(i) The Courts’ self-perception of their role 
First of all, constitutional review of the Euro-crisis law has led Constitutional Courts to clarify the 
limits of their jurisdiction and their role of adjudication. 
In decision no 39/2014, for example, the Italian Constitutional Court defines at length its role in 
contrast to that of the Court of Auditors. Indeed, a provision of a State decree-law – Article 7, Decree-
law 174/2012 – challenged by several Regions before the Constitutional Court, forced regional 
political bodies to adjust their draft regional budget acts to the regional section of the Court of 
Auditors’ audit report on fiscal stability and debt sustainability; otherwise, should a region avoid 
complying with the audit report, the regional budget act would never enter into force. By doing so, the 
decree-law illegitimately introduced a new form of constitutional review of legislation, in breach of 
the competence of the Constitutional Court (Articles 127 and 134 It. Const.). According to the 
Constitutional Court, the power to carry out constitutional review is only assigned by the Constitution 
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to the Court itself and no other bodies are entitled to annul legislation or to prevent its entry into force. 
Based on the principle of uniqueness of constitutional jurisdiction (decisions nos. 38/1957, 21/1959, 
6/1970 and 31/1961), the Constitution only enables the Constitutional Court to this end.119 
While in this case the Italian Constitutional Court positively asserted its jurisdiction, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court avoided taking a stance in a very important case dealing with the review of the 
constitutional revision of 2011 (Auto n. 9/2012). A recurso de amparo was brought before the Court 
by some MPs from the political group Esquerra Republicana-Izquierda Unida-Iniciativa Per 
Catalunya Verds against the constitutional amendments just passed, partly to constitutionalize the 
balanced budget clause. In particular, the amparo, on the one hand, sought annulment of the 
parliamentary resolutions and agreements leading to the adoption of the constitutional reform through 
the urgency procedure and in lectura única, i.e. without the committee stage, in the Senate, or 
parliamentary debate; and on the other it contested the use of the ordinary procedure to revise the 
Constitution (Article 167 instead of Article 168 Sp. Const.), although the constitutional bill was able to 
impair the protection of fundamental rights and to limit the prerogatives of MPs and citizens.  The 
Constitutional Court declared the amparo inadmissible as the governing bodies of the Parliament, 
according to the majority of the judges, simply applied the standing orders. The Court, however, did 
not decide on the merits of the case through a judgment (Sentencia); it only issued an order of 
inadmissibility (Auto). Indeed, the dissenting opinions of Justice Pablo Pérez Tremps and Justice Luis 
Ignacio Ortega Álvarez pointed to the missed opportunity for the Court to address for the first time 
ever the issue of the constitutionality of constitutional amendments in the Spanish democratic system, 
an issue of special complexity and of institutional significance that deserved much more careful 
consideration. In turn, the self-restraint of the Court, according to the dissenting opinions, jeopardized 
the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court and of the reform itself. Perhaps this Auto is the most 
significant demonstration of the deferential approach of the Court even when requested to decide on 
such prominent constitutional issues. 
At the opposite extreme is the Portuguese Constitutional Court, which has designed for itself a very 
prominent role during the Eurozone crisis and indeed has attracted harsh criticism. Once it set the test 
for the review of the constitutionality of Euro-crisis law in 2011 (Ácordão 396/2011), the Court has 
consistently applied this test to national legislation, primarily annual Budget Acts implementing the 
austerity measures adopted in exchange for the rescue package. The Court was internally divided in 
most of its judgments and it did not hesitate to depart from its past deferential approach toward the 
Parliament whenever a lack of compliance with minimum conditions for the protection of the 
principles of equality and proportionality could irremediably undermine the Portuguese Republic as a 
democratic state based on the rule of law (Article 2 Pt. Const.). By doing so, even in contrast with 
international and European obligations, the Court acted as the only counter-power to European 
institutions and to national political institutions.  
(ii) Emergency and crisis 
None of the three States – Italy, Portugal or Spain – has formally declared a state of emergency in the 
light of the Eurozone crisis. However, the ‘emergency’, the ‘crisis’, the ‘extraordinary and unusual 
economic conditions’ and ‘urgency’, have been constantly cited in the rulings of the Constitutional 
Courts, often to justify restrictions of rights and of regional legislative competences. On the one hand, 
the use of the ‘crisis’ in the constitutional reasoning of these Courts is not new, as arguments of crisis 
or emergency often reappear in periods of economic stalemate or recession and thus they are not 
particular to the present Eurozone crisis; on the other hand, however, it is an element of innovation 
insofar as the legal reaction to the Eurozone crisis, compared to past crises, will entail – regardless of 
the adoption of constitutional amendments – permanent or semi-permanent changes in national 
constitutional systems, as the Italian Constitutional Court has acknowledged. 
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It is also clear from the way ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’ are evoked that constitutional judges refer to a 
particular meaning of these states, namely the ‘emergency’ and the ‘crisis’ that derive from a financial 
disruption of the well-functioning of markets and of distributive and re-distributive policies. Indeed, 
the reasoning of the three Constitutional Courts is led by concerns for the shortage of financial 
resources, for their most appropriate distribution across policies and to people, about which level of 
government should take these decisions, and the degree of intervention by public authorities. In this 
regard, during the Eurozone crisis the kind of constitutional conflicts with which Constitutional Courts 
are confronted – concerning competence, resources and socio-economic rights – cannot easily be 
compared to those arising from other crises deriving, for example, from violations of public safety or 
environmental disasters, although the ultimate threat is common and consists in the potential violation 
of the rule of law.120 
The ‘crisis’ has been mentioned by the Portuguese Constitutional Court in all its decisions dealing 
with austerity measures since 2010. Nonetheless, in almost all its case law, the ‘crisis’ does not 
amount to a justification of public wage and pension cuts as, according to the Court, they were not 
transient, they were discriminatory and disproportionate to the targeted saving of public resources. 
Thus the crisis and the emergency deriving from the bailout did not prevent the Court from annulling 
legislation.121 
The Spanish Constitutional Court, by contrast, has used the argument of the ‘crisis’ with the opposite 
result, namely to uphold the validity of the Euro-crisis measures, in particular decree-laws that, 
according to Article 86 Sp. Const., are subject to material limits: decree-laws may not affect, amongst 
other things, the duties and freedoms of the citizens contained in Part 1 of the Constitution. However, 
the Constitutional Court has referred to the emergency and the crisis to justify the adoption by decree-
laws of labour reforms directly linked to the right of collective bargaining and to the right to work, as 
the measures challenged – the Court said – did not undermine the essential elements of those rights 
(Autos 85/2011 and 164/2014; Sentencia 119/2014).122 
In Italy the threat of a ‘crisis’ often appeared in the rulings of the Constitutional Court well before the 
Eurozone crisis started, for example during the period of financial turbulence in the 1990s.123 Since 
2010 – with the exception of 2011 – the ‘crisis’ has always been cited in the annual reports of the 
President of the Constitutional Court about the developments in constitutional case law as an element 
that orients the judgments of the Court.124 However, in the judgments of the Italian Constitutional 
Court in the last four years the ‘crisis’ or the severity of the economic situation have been expressly 
evoked in less than ten cases, and always in decisions that finally upheld the validity of the measures 
under review. Nevertheless, the argument of the ‘crisis’ is sometimes applied ad adiuvandum, given 
the decision of the Court, and other times a contrario to state that, in spite of the crisis, certain 
constitutional values or principles have to be protected and prevail over the contingency of the 
economic situation. For example, in decision no. 10/2010, because of the impairment of living 
                                                     
120 On this point, see D. Dyzenhaus, ‘States of Emergency’, in M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajó (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 442-462. 
121 This confirms what has been argued by D. Cole, ‘Judging the next emergency: judicial review and individual rights in 
times of crisis’, Michigan Law Review, vol. 101, 2002-2003, p. 2565-2595, against the conventional wisdom that judicial 
review is somewhat ineffective during crises. The author primarily considers crises that derive from the limitation of 
individual liberties in response to terrorism. 
122 According to L. Diez Sánchez, Legal manifestations of emergency in Spanish Euro-crisis law, paper presented on the 
occasion on the ‘Constitutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law’ Workshop, Law Department, European University 
Institute, Florence, 17-18 October 2014, these rulings depart from past precedents of the Spanish Constitutional Court 
before the Eurozone crisis (e.g. Sentencias 29/1994 and 68/2007). 
123 See T. Groppi & I. Spigno, ‘Constitutional reasoning in the Italian Constitutional Court’, in A. Jakab, A. Dyevre & G. 
Itzcovich (eds.), Comparative Constitutional Reasoning, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.   
124 See M. Benvenuti, La Corte costituzionale, in F. Angelini & M. Benvenuti (eds.), Il diritto costituzionale alla prova  della 
crisi economica, Napoli, Jovene, 2012, p. 375-420, who makes reference to the role of previous financial crises, like in 
the 1990s, in the reasoning of the Italian Constitutional Court. 
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conditions throughout the country deriving from the crisis, the Court considered the expansion of State 
legislative competence in matters of social assistance to provide the so-called ‘social card’ in 
compliance with the Constitution. By contrast, in decision no. 151/2012, although the validity of the 
State Decree-law no. 78/2010 was upheld, the Constitutional Court considered that, even when facing 
a financial crisis, the State does not have the power to derogate from the constitutional allocation of 
legislative competences and that the principle salus rei publicae suprema lex esto cannot be invoked to 
suspend the constitutional protection of regional and local autonomies (§ 4). By the same token, 
however, the need to restrain public expenditure responds to the exceptional and contingent 
requirements of political, economic and social solidarity that requires the involvement of all levels of 
government ‘to cope with the severe economic and financial crisis that Italy is going through (§ 
5.2.2)’. In decision no. 223/2012, the Court explicitly rejected the argument of the crisis to justify the 
freezing of salary adjustments and the cut in allowances for magistrates in the name, amongst others, 
of the principle of equality. 
Finally, in decision no. 310/2013 the Italian Constitutional Court differentiated between the current 
Eurozone crisis and previous crises, in particular about the duration in force of the austerity measures, 
which it deemed to be longer now than in the past.  
‘Because of the necessary long-term and multi-annual prospects of the current budget cycle, these 
sacrifices may apply for periods, certainly defined, but longer than those taken into account by the 
judgments of this Court mentioned, issued with regard to the budgetary cycle law of 1992 
(§13.5)’.125 
In this case, the Court used the argument of the crisis to uphold the validity of State Decree-law no. 
78/2010 about the blocking of salary adjustments for non-contracted workers in the fields of education 
and university, by making reference to the intensity of the Eurozone crisis and thus to the sacrifices 
required compared to the 1990s financial crisis. 
(iii) Economic arguments 
The three Constitutional Courts, and in particular the Portuguese Court, widely use economic 
arguments in their decisions. However, while the Portuguese Court has largely relied on calculations, 
estimates and data to provide justification for its case law on Euro-crisis measures, especially when 
wage and pension cuts have been under scrutiny, this has not been very usual in the Italian and 
Spanish Courts, which have often made references in their judgments to the financial impacts of the 
legislative provisions under scrutiny, but have only exceptionally used mathematical reasoning.  
Applying economic arguments in constitutional reasoning is not something entirely new for these 
Courts. Nevertheless, during the Eurozone crisis resort to this by constitutional judges has reached 
levels that are incomparable to their previous usual practice, in terms of both frequency and extent.  
Moreover, how Constitutional Courts manage these ‘economic subjects’ remains unclear. The use of 
economics in constitutional interpretation is not eased by technical experts and advisors working for 
these Courts to assist their understanding of the financial impact of judgments. In the Italian, 
Portuguese and Spanish Constitutional Courts there is no body or committee that carries out impact 
assessment, including the quantification of the fiscal effects, of constitutional case law other than the 
support provided by law clerks, some of whom have a clear expertise in matters of tax law,126 and 
neither is the presentation of amicus curiae briefs providing evidence and expert knowledge on the 
subject matter of a case allowed before these Courts. 
The Constitutional Court of Portugal has used economic arguments in its constitutional reasoning in 
almost all its judgments on Euro-crisis law. For example, in Acordão no. 353/2012, the Court 
calculated the variation in salaries and pensions before and after the Budget Act for 2012, aiming to 
understand whether the cuts were reasonable or justifiable. The Court found they were not, and on the 
basis of the standard set in this judgment has also made extensive use of data, estimates and 
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regressions in other decisions. The source of such in-depth knowledge of economic and mathematical 
methods on the part of constitutional judges is not revealed – sometimes government estimates are 
cited, which raises questions regarding their legitimate use. This departs from legal considerations, 
although the latter have finally grounded the decisions. According to Article 222 of the Portuguese 
Constitution, all constitutional judges are required to have a legal background. Six of the thirteen 
judges ‘shall obligatorily be chosen from among the judges of the remaining courts’; the others from 
among jurists. 
In contrast to the Italian and the Spanish constitutional judgments on Euro-crisis law,127 the Portuguese 
Court has always cited scholarship, preferably legal scholars, and often foreign law and the legal 
practice of other EU Member States (Acordão no. 187/2013, § 18 and 19), but has never explained 
why and how it engaged in such mathematical exercises. For example, while the Court assessed the 
financial impact of public wage and pension cuts in Acordão no. 187/2013, § 95, it did not at the same 
time calculate the costs for Portugal of deviating from the conditions set by the rescue package which 
was renegotiated in 2013.  
In Italy, by contrast, the Constitutional Court, which is equally composed of lawyers by training (law 
professors, judges, practising lawyers),128 has on several occasions evoked the macroeconomic 
scenario and the fiscal constraints of the Eurozone crisis as a background for its decisions, but it has 
only cited figures and calculations in its reasoning occasionally, for example in judgments dealing 
with an increase in deductions from public salaries (decision no. 223/2012, §14) and with the so-called 
‘golden pensions’(decision no. 116/2013, §2.1). In the first case, the Court compared the percentage of 
deduction under the past and the current regimes, in particular the different tax rates; in the second 
case, the Court compared the size of the solidarity contribution imposed by Decree-law 98/2011 on 
holders of pensions above 90,000 euro a year with the lower contribution on all incomes above that 
threshold provided for by a subsequent decree-law, 138/2011, to conclude that the former was 
unreasonable. 
The Spanish Constitutional Court, which like the other two Courts is composed of lawyers by training 
and by experience,129 used economic arguments at length in one of its most significant decisions taken 
during the Eurozone crisis, Sentencia no 206/2013.130 In this decision, in which some of the provisions 
of the Budget Act for 2009 were found unconstitutional,131 the Court engaged in a highly detailed 
examination of the underlying economic justifications for the Budget Act when it had to address the 
third challenge posed by the applicants, the then parliamentary minority of Partido Popular. The 
Court concluded that those justifications were not arbitrary. 
This third question the Court was requested to answer concerned the allegation that the Budget Act 
was detached and inconsistent with the macroeconomic scenario with which it had to cope. In 
particular, according to the MPs of Partido Popular, the forecasts of revenues and expenditures on 
which the Budget Act for 2009 was based were too optimistic in terms of the estimated growth of the 
gross domestic product (§ 7). This allegation was based on many estimates produced by public and 
private bodies independent from the Government and, if confirmed, would lead to violation of several 
constitutional provisions, amongst which were new Article 135.2 Sp. Const. and the balanced budget 
                                                     
127 The reference to scholarly works by the Italian Constitutional Court, as well as by any other court, in case law is forbidden 
by Article 118.3 of the Implementing Provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. See T. Groppi & I. Spigno, ‘Constitutional 
reasoning in the Italian Constitutional Court’, cit., p. 27. 
128 According to Article 134 It. Const., ‘The judges of the Constitutional Courts shall be chosen from among judges, 
including those retired, of the ordinary and administrative higher Courts, university professors of law and lawyers with at 
least twenty years practice’. 
129 Article 159.2 Sp. Const. States that members of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed among magistrates and 
prosecutors, university professors, public officials and lawyers, all of whom with at least fifteen years of practice in law 
in their profession. 
130 See also section II.B (iii). 
131 See Ley 2/2008, de 23 de diciembre, por la que se aprueban los Presupuestos Generales del Estado para 2009. 
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clause, as well as of the Ley general de estabilidad presupuestaria, part of the constitutional block, 
and of the parliamentary rules of procedure. 
The Court decided to consider primarily if the alleged mismatch between the Budget Act and the real 
economy could amount to a violation of the prohibition of arbitrariness, a constitutional principle 
entrenched in Article 9.3 Sp. Const. The Court initially recalled its past case law – Sentencia no. 
13/2007 – where it advocated self-restraint vis-à-vis the choices by the legislative branch. The review 
by the Spanish Constitutional Court was limited to assessing whether the challenged Act ‘lacked any 
possible rational explanation’ and so it analyzed all the potential justifications behind the norms and 
their economic consequences. Thus, the Court considered as a sign of the economic reliability of the 
Budget Act the fact that several independent agents, and not only national ones, like the European 
Commission, had examined the estimates during the budgetary process. Moreover, the Court affirmed 
that, given the arrangements of the budgetary cycle, the budget bill was presented to Parliament on 1 
October 2008 and was based on forecasts released in June 2008, whereas the forecasts for economic 
growth published later, in late November 2008, signalled a significant deterioration in the 
macroeconomic situation of the whole Euro area due to the financial crisis, which could not have been 
predicted when the budget was drafted. In other words, according to the Spanish Court, there was no 
way to ensure that the economic forecasts on which the annual Budget was based would be met during 
the fiscal year. 
Before the allegation of unconstitutionality on the ground of arbitrariness of the Budget Act was 
finally rejected, and in spite of the fact that it had claimed that it did not interfere with the discretion of 
political bodies, the Spanish Constitutional Court engaged in a very detailed examination of economic 
data on the gross domestic product for 2008 and 2009, which until then had been very unusual for this 
Court: 
‘This is also evident if one examines, retrospectively, the actual trend in the real GDP in 2009. 
According to the constitutional challenge, on average the economic forecasts estimated a drop in 
the real GDP by 0.9 per 100, compared to the Budget Act, which considered as valid an increase 
of 1 per 100 (i.e. 1.9 points above the average quoted). However, the actual decline in the GDP in 
that year, according to official data published by Eurostat was found to be of 3.7 points’.132 
 (iv) Constitutional principles  
A common element underlies the case law of the three Constitutional Courts on Euro-crisis measures 
potentially affecting rights: cases have usually been solved on the ground of constitutional principles 
rather than on the enforcement of specific rights, in particular social rights (the right to health care, the 
right to work, the right to take collective action or the right to social assistance).133 
As highlighted, this approach can be explained by the significant financial implications deriving from 
the acknowledgment of a social right by the Courts compared to the application of principles, which 
entail case-by-case balancing with further competing principles. As a consequence, it is much easier 
for constitutional judges asked to decide on such controversial issues to find agreement on the basis of 
constitutional principles, which can be subject to re-determination in future cases, rather than on social 
rights, which could create new legitimate expectations. The difficulty in reaching a consensus within 
the Courts is certainly more problematic in the Italian Constitutional Court, where no separate 
opinions are admitted, but has become evident in the case law of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, 
where the number of dissenting opinions in most judgments can give an idea of the splits and 
cleavages created in the Court by the Euro-crisis law (Ácordãos 187/2013 and 430/2013), as well as in 
                                                     
132 See § 8, Sentencia no 206/2013, my own translation from the Spanish: ‘Así resulta además evidente si se examina, 
obviamente en retrospectiva, el comportamiento real del PIB en el ejercicio de 2009. Según la demanda, la media de las 
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133 See also section III.B (i). 
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some decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court, for example on the constitutionality of the 
procedure to enact constitutional amendments in 2011 and on civil proceedings and mortgages (Autos 
9/2012 and 113/2011). 
In this vein, which is perfectly consistent with the pre-crisis case law, the principles of equality, of the 
prohibition of arbitrariness, of legitimate expectations, of judicial independence, of proportionality and 
of reasonableness have been extensively used by the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish Constitutional 
Courts to assess the constitutionality of right limitations by Euro-crisis law, even where, as in Italy and 
even more so in Portugal, a wide catalogue of social rights are entrenched in the constitutional text. 
Reliance on these principles by the Constitutional Courts can thus be seen in continuity with 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
In particular, the proportionality principle and the principle of reasonableness have been confirmed as 
cornerstones of the constitutional reasoning during the Eurozone crisis.134 The judgments of the three 
Constitutional Courts dealing with discrimination imposed as a consequence of the implementation of 
Euro-crisis law between the private and the public sectors, among different categories of workers and 
pensioners, and between different standards of social assistance across the national territory, have 
usually been solved by applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.  
The Portuguese and the Spanish Constitutional Courts admit that they apply the ‘three-part test’ of 
proportionality developed by the German Constitutional Court, should a violation of a constitutional 
right occur:135 first, they ascertain whether the measure under scrutiny is able to achieve the proposed 
objective; second, whether it was necessary or whether other less restrictive means could have been 
used instead to produce the same effects; third, whether the measure at stake is able to provide benefits 
and advantages in the general interest which are far more significant than the costs and the problems 
created.136  
The Portuguese Constitutional Court, in line with its past case law, has used the principle of 
proportional equality to ground its most significant decisions on Euro-crisis law. According to the 
Court, whenever differential treatment between groups of people occurs, the equality principle 
requires this treatment to be appropriate, necessary and rational with regard to the objective that is 
deemed to justify it. However – and this is where the proportionality test comes in – the sacrifices 
required of the group discriminated against cannot be excessive, i.e. cannot supersede the benefits 
granted to another group, from the viewpoint of the targeted objective and of the treatment reserved. 
The principle of proportional equality is subject to stricter scrutiny than just checking the ground of 
violation of the principle of arbitrariness.137 The unequal treatment must be materially grounded and 
assessment of it is based on a triangular relationship to evaluate the degree of differentiation imposed, 
in its relationship with the objective fulfilled (goal-means), in a comparison between the group 
affected by the differentiation and others, and therefore between the two groups regarding the 
                                                     
134 Most of the study of constitutional interpretation has been dedicated to the principle of proportionality: see, for example, 
R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, A. 
Stone Sweet & J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, vol. 47, 2008, p. 73 ff., and A. Barak, Proportionality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2012, p. 131 ff. 
135 See P. Machete & T. Violante, ‘O princípio da proporcionalidade e da razonabilidade na jurisprudência constitucional, 
também em relação com a jurisprudência dos Tribunais Europeus’, XV Trilateral Conference of the Italian, Portuguese 
and Spanish Constitutional Courts, Rome, Palazzo della Consulta, 24-26 October 2013. p. 17 ff. and E. Roca Trías & A. 
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136 The Portuguese Constitutional Court has derived the principle of proportionality from Article 2 of the Port. Const.; the 
Spanish Constitutional Court from Article 53.1 of the Sp. Const. 
137 See P. Machete & T. Violante, ‘O princípio da proporcionalidade e da razonabilidade na jurisprudência constitucional, 
também em relação com a jurisprudência dos Tribunais Europeus’, cit., p. 79. 
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objective.138 In particular, after Ácordão 187/2013 the application of the principle of proportional 
equality attracted severe criticism from scholars and from the dissenting judges in the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court on the ground of its implications for the domestic constitutional system.139 The 
majority in the Court has been accused of mixing together equality and proportionality in that case, of 
overlooking the definition of tertium comparationis, and of comparing situations – namely those of 
public and private workers – that are not comparable in terms of status and of labour conditions. The 
Court thus shifted the object of review to the effectiveness of the public salary cuts to check whether 
they were proportionate; this effectiveness was evaluated on the ground of the ability of the cuts to 
reduce the public deficit. Such an assessment implied a value judgment on the part of the Court about 
what was needed to overcome the crisis and in turn resulted in merging different levels of analysis: 
equality, proportionality and economic effectiveness.140 
By contrast, in Spain, given the few cases in which the Constitutional Court has delivered a judgment 
on the merits of the controversy on Euro-crisis measures and the usual resort to interlocutory orders, 
either of inadmissibility or of admissibility on procedural grounds, the proportionality test has been 
rarely used when assessing the constitutionality of those measures (e.g. Sentencia no 119/2014). 
In Italy, where the distinction operated by the Constitutional Court between proportionality and 
reasonableness is not really straightforward,141 scrutiny of the reasonableness of Euro-crisis measures 
as a crucial standard to assess their constitutionality can be found in those judgments dealing with 
limitations of allowances, the freezing of salary adjustments and pension cuts (decisions nos. 223/2012 
and 310/2013). Originally, the Italian Constitutional Court referred reasonableness to Article 3 Const., 
and to the principle of equality against discriminatory treatment in equivalent situations. However, 
since the end of the 1990s scrutiny of the reasonableness of challenged measures has acquired 
autonomy and it is now applied ‘to complement and support any other constitutional principle invoked 
as a standard for the Court to decide’.142 For example, in judgment no. 223/2012 the scrutiny of the 
reasonableness of the decree-law at stake was complemented by scrutiny of its compliance with the 
principle of economic independence of the judiciary. The Court assesses the reasonableness of Euro-
crisis measures – like any other legislative measure – on the grounds of intrinsic incoherence, illogical 
nature, and inconsistency with regard to the legal system or with reference to the aim pursued by the 
legislator.143  
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140 See G. Coelho, P. Caro de Sousa, ‘«La morte dei mille tagli»’, cit., p. 538-539. 
141 See M. Cartabia, ‘I principi di ragionevolezza e proporzionalità nella giurisprudenza costituzionale italiana’, XV Trilateral 
Conference of the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish Constitutional Courts, Rome, Palazzo della Consulta, 24-26 October 
2013, p. 10, available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/RI_Cartabia_Roma2013.pdf.  
The Italian Constitutional Court appears to apply proportionality through a more structured test than reasonableness (see, 
for example, decisions nos. 1130/1988 and 1 /2014).  A. Barak, Proportionality, cit, p. 373-378, highlights that when a 
limitation of constitutional rights is at stake it is really difficult to detect differences between the proportionality test and 
the reasonableness test in order to ascertain the constitutionality of such limitation. By contrast, under other 
circumstances, for example when dealing with the discretion of public authorities under administrative law, the 
distinction would be easier, since reasonableness would not be limited to the goal-means scenario: see N. Emilou, The 
Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study, London, Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 37. 
142 See M. Cartabia, ‘I principi di ragionevolezza e proporzionalità nella giurisprudenza costituzionale italiana’, cit., p. 1, own 
translation.  
143 See G. Scaccia, Gli strumenti della ragionevolezza nel giudizio, Torino, Giappichelli, 2007. 
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Furthermore, in particular in decision no. 264/2012, the Italian Constitutional Court emphasized the 
need for a systematic interpretation of the Constitution especially in a time of crisis with regard to the 
protection of rights and other competing constitutional principles and values, in order to read the 
constitutional text in an integrated and unitary manner and to balance potentially divergent claims 
stemming from the Constitution.144 
The principle of proportionality has been applied mainly in the field of the protection of rights, 
although not exclusively. For example, in Italy and Spain the limitations imposed upon regional 
legislation have been subject to scrutiny of whether the constraints were proportionate to the aim 
fulfilled. Both Constitutional Courts have stated, although not always in a consistent way, that in order 
to be justified such restrictions on regional autonomy must show a transitional character and must be 
matched with a well-grounded justification, i.e. measures taken generically in the name of the public 
good would not survive a proportionality scrutiny. 
(v) Tackling the issue of the nature of Euro-crisis law and its constitutionally admissible 
limits: the Portuguese case   
Beside the test to assess the constitutionality of Euro-crisis law that the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court has developed and has more or less used consistently since 2011 and the constant reference to 
constitutional principles rather than to the social rights invoked to solve these cases (section III.A), 
there is a further element of continuity in its constitutional case law compared to the pre-crisis period. 
When assessing the compliance of wage and pension cuts with the Constitution, the Court has always 
mentioned fiscal constraints deriving from the rescue package, from EU Treaties and from the 
Stability and Growth Pact, as revised by the six-pack and the two-pack.145 Although the Court has 
never used these measures of EU law and of international law as a standard for its judgments, the 
reference to external constraints on the national budgetary process and to structural reforms has been a 
leitmotiv in its constitutional case law. 
In contrast to the Portuguese Constitutional Court, neither of the other two Courts has chosen to 
explicitly tackle the issue of the legal nature of Euro-crisis law and of its permissible limits under the 
Constitution – an outcome that has depended mainly on the avenues of access to the Constitutional 
Courts in Italy and Spain, on the focus of judicial review, which has been much more directed at 
solving conflicts of competences rather than ensuring right protection, and on the timing of the 
judgments.146 
In the last two years, until Acórdão no. 575/2014, the Portuguese Constitutional Court gradually 
clarified its position towards Euro-crisis law. In the landmark judgment no. 187/2013 the Court only 
referred to the ‘international arm’ of the rescue package, namely to the Memoranda of understanding 
and the Financial and Assistance Programme and to the EFSF, while neglecting the ‘EU side’ of the 
financial assistance, i.e. the EFSM (EU Council Regulation no. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010). On that 
occasion, the Court treated the Memoranda of understanding and their updates as legally binding and 
as providing for direct legal constraints upon the Portuguese constitutional system. Indeed, in 
judgment no. 602 and no. 794/2013 the Court undertook a detailed examination of whether the 
provisions of Law no. 23/2012 and Law no. 68/2013 were actually the result of the transposition of 
specific clauses from the Memorandum of understanding into national law. Subsequently, in Acórdão 
no. 862/2013, the Court compared the content of the Memorandum of Understanding about financial 
assistance to Portugal with the prospective Budget Act for 2014 – as this was an ex ante  review – in 
order to evaluate the reasonableness of the public pension cuts of 10 per cent. The Court found the 
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Conference of the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish Constitutional Courts, Rome, Palazzo della Consulta, 24-26 October 
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reduction in the public pensions provided by the Budget Act greater than that set out in the 
Memorandum itself, which in turn implied the existence of a considerable margin for manoeuvre by 
the legislator in shaping the content of the domestic austerity measures. 
The latest developments in the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the cuts in public spending, in 
particular in the wages and pensions of public workers, in relation to European and international 
obligations came from Acórdão no. 575/2014. In this ruling, the Court finally disclosed its standing 
vis-à-vis Euro-crisis law, in particular EU law in the framework of the excessive deficit procedure. 
Indeed, the Court considered the EU Council of Ministers’ recommendations within the excessive 
deficit procedure against Portugal to be non-legally binding insofar as they did not impose the 
adoption of concrete and ad hoc policies to put public spending and the deficit under control. In this 
field – the Court added – EU law is binding upon Member States only with regard to the objectives 
set, not on the national means chosen to reach those objectives. Furthermore, the Court added that the 
adaptation of national legislation to the standard fixed by EU law did not entail any consequence from 
the viewpoint of the application of the Constitution. 
‘By contrast, in a multilevel constitutional system, where several legal systems interact, domestic 
norms necessarily have to comply with the Constitution (as, according to the Portuguese 
Constitution – Article 221 – it is the Constitutional Court which has the competence for the 
administration of justice on legal and constitutional matters. Indeed, precisely EU law provides 
that the Union respects the national identities of its Member States reflected in their fundamental 
political and constitutional structures (Article 4.2 TEU).’147  
Thus, the Portuguese Constitutional Court first appeared to overlook the problem of a potential 
conflict between EU law, in particular Euro-crisis law, and the Constitution, as if the enforcement of 
the former did not have implications for the latter, but then very clearly pointed to the ‘priority’ of the 
national Constitution by relying on the national identity clause included in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
although, according to many scholars, this clause is not designed to put the primacy of EU law into 
question but rather to move from ‘absolute’ to ‘relative’ primacy.148 In spite of the fact that the 
national identity clause was cited in an obiter dictum, and before it entered into the merits of the case, 
the Constitutional Court did not even mention the principle of primacy of EU law but stated 
beforehand the obligation for national legislation to comply with the Constitution, while it based this 
assumption on Article 4.2 TEU. 
In addition to this statement, the Portuguese Constitutional Court moved forward to say that in this 
field of law – namely Euro-crisis law – there is no divergence between EU law and Portuguese 
constitutional law so as to clear up any doubts about an insurgence of conflicts. According to the 
Court, there is instead a convergence between the two, based on the fact that the guiding principles 
used by constitutional judges to solve the case law on Euro-crisis measures, the principle of equality, 
the principle of proportionality, and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, are at the 
core of the rule of law and an inherent part of the common European legal heritage, which the EU is 
also bound to respect. The Court, however, appeared to disregard the very nature of these principles. 
Indeed, equality, proportionality, and legitimate expectations can be subject to different balancing, 
depending on the jurisdiction and on the national Constitution, and the balancing undertaken at 
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conformar-se com a Constituição (competindo ao Tribunal Constitucional, de acordo com a Constituição Portuguesa, 
administrar a justiça em matérias jurídico-constitucionais (cfr. artigo 221.º da CRP)). Aliás, o próprio direito da União 
Europeia estabelece que a União respeita a identidade nacional dos seus Estados-membros, refletida nas estruturas 
políticas e constitucionais fundamentais de cada um deles (cfr. artigo 4.º, n.º 2, do TUE).’ 
148 On this point, see A. Von Bogdandy, S. Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the 
Lisbon Treaty’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 48, 2011, p. 1-38 and B. Guastaferro, ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of 
Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause’, Yearbook of European Law, vol. 31 (1), 2012, 
263-318. 
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national level might not necessarily in practice match the understanding of these principles under EU 
law and in particular by the Court of Justice of the EU.149 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Constitutional judgments on Euro-crisis law in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, have strengthened 
tendencies or confirmed precedents that already featured in the case law of the three Constitutional 
Courts, namely, depending on the country, the limitation of regional legislative and budgetary 
autonomy (Italy and Spain), a more weighted balancing between social rights, financial resources, and 
legitimate expectations (Italy and Portugal, though going in opposite directions), and the pre-eminence 
of constitutional principles in the constitutional adjudication of rights (all three countries). In addition, 
in the case of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, the principle of proportional equality has continued 
to play the crucial role it had already been given by the constitutional jurisprudence of democratic 
Portugal, although – as many commentators have argued – in some decisions on Euro-crisis law the 
principle has been subject to a very broad and questionable application (Ácordão no. 187/2013). In 
other words, with a few exceptions the case law of these three Courts on Euro-crisis measures has 
been in continuity with their pre-crisis judgments. 
The design and the practice of the systems of constitutional adjudication seem to explain this result, 
starting with elements like the composition of the Courts, the access to them and the timing of the 
judgments. In Spain, for example, the delay in taking decisions on the merits of the case usually leads 
the Court to declare constitutional challenges inadmissible or to provide interpretations in conformity 
with the Constitution.  
Moreover, the Italian and the Portuguese Constitutional Courts have relied on ‘tests of 
constitutionality’ that they had already developed with regard to derogations from the protection of 
constitutional rights and these tests have been applied consistently during the Eurozone crisis. The 
consistency and continuity in the approach of the Courts is also confirmed by their constitutional 
reasoning. For example, in spite of the rich catalogue of social rights enshrined in the Italian and 
especially in the Portuguese Constitutions, the case law has almost always been decided on the ground 
of constitutional principles, in particular those of proportionality and equality; a finding that shows the 
concerns of these Courts for the potential financial consequences which would be triggered by a 
general strengthening of social rights, in contrast with a case-by-case approach favoured by 
adjudication grounded on constitutional principles. 
Even the constitutionalization of the balanced budget clause in Italy and in Spain does not appear to 
have revolutionized constitutional case law. The constitutionalisation in Spain was indeed anticipated 
by a landmark judgment of the Constitutional Court (Sentencia no. 134/2011) and the Italian 
Constitutional Court had already adopted an austerity approach for years – for example in the previous 
period of financial instability in the 1990s – before the Eurozone crisis erupted. 
If the general trend in the case law of each Court is thus continuity, with a few occasional disruptions, 
this does not imply that there is necessarily a convergence in the case law of the Italian, Portuguese 
and Spanish Courts. The Italian Constitutional Court, for example, has usually paid a lot of attention to 
fiscal sustainability and to public accounts during the Eurozone crisis – an approach which also seems 
shared by the few judgments delivered by the Spanish Court – in spite of the fact that the balanced 
budget clause has only been in operation since January 2014 and has not been a standard of review 
yet. This Court has also expressly acknowledged that the legal reaction to the Eurozone crisis is 
                                                     
149 On the principle of proportionality, see, for example, N. Emiliou, The principle of proportionality in European Law: A 
comparative study, London, Kluwer Law International, 1996; W. van Gerven, ‘The effect of proportionality on the action 
of Member States of the European Community: National viewpoints from continental Europe’. In E. Ellis (ed.), The 
principle of proportionality in the Law of Europe, Oxford-Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, 1999, p. 37-64; and A. Barak, 
Proportionality. Constitutional rights and their limitations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 184-199, 
who highlights an extra-EU influence on the way this principle is managed in some EU countries, i.e. the influence of 
Canada in Ireland or the influence of the ECHR on Central and Eastern countries. 
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different from the previous crises, as the austerity measures are expected to endure for years (decision 
no. 310/2013).  
By contrast, the Portuguese Constitutional Court has placed itself in the position of the main guarantor 
‘of the democratic state based on the rule of law’ (Article 2 Pt. Const.), also in the context of the 
present crisis. The Court has not hesitated to sanction – sometimes disputably and not always in 
cooperation with the legislator – the action of political institutions whenever they have overstepped the 
constitutional limits set in the case law. As the Court has recently claimed, the limits provided by the 
Constitution in this regard form part of the Portuguese national identity, which EU law is also bound 
to respect (Ácordão no. 575/2014). 
These different outcomes of constitutional case law can be explained by the standards of constitutional 
review applied, by the particular relationship between the Constitutional Court, Parliament and 
Government in each country, and by the way Euro-crisis law has been managed by the three Courts. 
For example, while in Italy and Spain no decision was taken by the Constitutional Courts on the 
implementation of rescue packages – Italy did not even request a bailout – the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court was directly confronted with the issue, with the legal status and the binding 
nature of these instruments. Therefore, the economic situation of the Member State also, directly or 
indirectly, influenced constitutional case law. 
 

  
 
